

Current History

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Changing American Politics

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Coming Next Month

In September, we shall center our interest on **AMERICAN FARM POLICY** because of general interest in farm policy as a campaign issue and because thousands of high school and college debaters will be discussing farm policy in the coming academic year. Articles will include:

The Role of the Farmer in American Life, by Earle Ross, Professor of History, Iowa State College.

The Changing Nature of the American Farm, by Vernon Carstensen, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin.

Price Problems in American Agriculture, by Irene Till, co-author of *Prices and Price Policy* and formerly senior economist, Federal Trade Commission.

The Government and the Farmer, by Theodore Saloutos, Associate Professor of History, University of California at Los Angeles.

Who Speaks for the Farmer? by Wesley McCune, author of *The Farm Bloc* and at present working on a book on pressure groups in farm organizations to appear in the fall.

The Problem of Agricultural Surpluses, by John Black, Professor of Economics, Harvard University.

Copies of this issue may be reserved now by writing to the publication office. With orders of 10 or more quantity discounts are allowed, and copies of a Debate Guide are included without charge. Write also for information about our issues on *United States Agriculture* (February, 1954) and *American Farm Leaders* (June, 1955), still available for study use at quantity discounts.

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Current History

Vol. 31

AUGUST, 1956

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Every four years the American people focus on their national leadership and their national problems. From now until November we shall be re-evaluating ourselves. In this issue six specialists look backward and forward, comparing our traditional voting patterns with the voting habits of our contemporaries. Especially important are the changes in the nature of the Democratic and Republican parties.

The Changing Nature of the Republican Party

BY OSCAR HANDLIN

Associate Professor of History, Harvard University

IN ITS century of eventful history, the Republican Party has had numerous achievements to its credit. None is more impressive than the miracle of its survival. Time and again, during these hundred years, the Party has been presented with strategic opportunities for consolidating its national strength and for attaching to itself the loyalties of a solid majority of Americans. On each occasion it has proven incapable of grasping those opportunities. If it nevertheless survives and continues to elect candidates to office; it is more despite its failures than because of its successes.

Since the election of 1928, the G.O.P. has been a minority; and its place in the national picture has been steadily shrinking. In the South it has no dependable support at all; the labor movement, now unified, is almost consistently hostile; only a portion of the farm population, and that a declining one, is loyal to it; and it makes only irregular and spasmodic appeals to the independent white collar and middle class groups. Nevertheless it survives. The reasons for its persistence, which are the same as those for its failures, may prove enlightening in judging its course in the next few months.

By the end of the First World War, the Republican Party had already missed two strategic opportunities for establishing itself. It had begun, like all our national parties, as an alliance of disparate elements. But among the other groups drawn into its ranks between 1856 and 1860 were the relics of the Free-Soilers and the Conscience Whigs of an earlier decade—men who represented influential groups of urban artisans and family farmers, opposed to slavery, and interested in a wide range of reforms. The intellectual and political atmosphere of the 1860's stimulated and strengthened this element in the Party.

Lincoln himself was not the leader of any faction; but he generated a humanitarian spirit that encouraged those who wished to make government an instrument of human improvement. The general slogans in terms of which the Civil War was fought had the same effect; and then, the Democrats were tainted with copperhead strains and with disloyalty.

The effects of these initial advantages did not endure. In the decades that followed the peace the Republican Party dissipated its actual and its potential strength. The

Party failed to arrive at a solution that would enable it permanently to organize any substantial body of followers in the South. Thereafter it would always suffer from its sectional character. In the North, furthermore, it proved incapable of dealing with the issues of the development of big business and the corruption of government. The liberal alliance with the Democrats in 1872 and after gradually wore away the power of the reform faction in the G.O.P.; although the Mugwumps tried to do so, they failed to keep the discontented loyal to Republicanism.

As time passed, the party of Lincoln tended increasingly to become the stronghold of a dwindling old guard. Only the infection of the Democratic Party by Populism at the end of the century preserved a modicum of moderate strength in the Republican camp.

The Party also permitted a strategic opportunity to pass it by when it proved incapable of confronting the challenge of the Progressive Movement. At the turn of the century, it once more enjoyed enormous advantages over its rivals. The Democrats had become entangled in the confusing issue of free silver, and lost influence as that financial panacea was quite discredited after 1900. The Democrats also took the blame for the shocking corruption in municipal government.

On the other hand the Republicans, under Theodore Roosevelt, had gained a reputation—which they may not altogether have deserved—for willingness to lead in the struggle against monopoly and for the reconstruction of national government. Furthermore, such Republican state governors as LaFollette in Wisconsin and Hughes in New York had displayed the ability to lead a reform movement on a very broad scale. On the eve of the election of 1910, the most promising elements in the Progressive Movement seemed to find a more congenial home in the Republican Party than elsewhere.

Yet in the next few years G.O.P. fumbling put a Democratic president in the White House for the first time in 20 years and an internecine struggle split the Party. Its two wings drew together once more in 1916. But they were never again able to unite

on the issues of progressivism. The old cankerous divisions persisted long thereafter.

CRITICAL FAILURE

The truly critical failure, however, came in the 1920's. Superficially this was a decade of unmatched Republican prosperity, an era in which political control at many levels of government seemed to rest solidly on a basis of economic prosperity and well-being. Yet it was precisely in this decade that the American electorate was being transformed in a fashion that would ultimately prove disastrous to the G.O.P.

In the next 20 years, an immense body of new voters were to take their place at the polls. These people were not simply drawn from a new generation growing up. Rather they were part of a totally new sector of the population moving into political action for the first time. By the end of the 1930's they were to be a decisive factor in the electoral strength of the nation.

An objective observer assessing the potential strength of these new groups and their existing inclinations in 1920 would, no doubt, have predicted that they would add substantially to the power of the Republican Party. Mostly, these people were made up of the underprivileged elements in American society, and particularly of the "minorities" who had heretofore been largely un-vocal and unrepresented in government. All these groups were in a position that made them susceptible to the attractions of Republican leadership.

Only the Irish among them had a long, consistent pattern of Democratic affiliation; and even these folk were discontent and ready for desertion. Wilson had not been popular with them; the war was in hindsight a blunder; the peace and the League of Nations seemed contrivances of the British; and the Democratic administration had stood idly by while Ireland struggled for independence. A well calculated campaign for their support might have drawn substantial numbers of Irish-Americans over to the Republican Party.

Such converts would have joined significant nuclei of foreign-born citizens already in the Party. The German-Americans and

the Scandinavians had long since been favorable to the G.O.P., and their misgivings over the war had strengthened that affiliation. In addition, in many of the growing cities, the newer immigrant groups had drifted into the Republican Party, by virtue of the fact that there was no place for them in the opposition. Most of the Democratic city machines were tightly controlled by the Irish. Occasionally one like Tammany Hall made some effort also to hold the Germans and Jews. But few party organizations were that farsighted; they consisted rather of tight ethnic enclaves in which strangers were unwelcome.

The incoming Italians, Poles and Jews in most communities had found the atmosphere of the Democratic clubhouses uncongenial, and had tended to drift over to the Republicans. The G.O.P., weak in the cities, had been more inclined to welcome them than had the Democrats. These were as yet small groups. The habit of voting and office-seeking had not been well developed among them. Yet they were to grow significantly in strength in the future.

Furthermore, whoever sought their support after 1920 would no longer have to compete with the Socialists and other radicals who had once courted them. The Socialist parties entered upon a radical decline after the end of the war. The Red scare threw the odium of disloyalty upon them; and the emergence of communism splintered them into factions that would be largely self-frustrating in the next two decades. The result was that the minorities were in a position to be attracted to the Republican Party, had that Party wished to use them.

Finally, and perhaps most important, a growing number of Negroes were taking an interest in politics. The memories of the Civil War and of the place of the G.O.P. in liberation had not faded among the Negro citizens. If they had, the solid Democratic South was a constant reminder of where their interests lay. Below the Mason-Dixon Line, of course, the Negroes could not vote. But in the Northern cities they were already in 1920 a factor of considerable importance and their weight would grow immeasurably in the decades that followed. In 1920 and for some years thereafter, the Negroes were

unshakeably Republican in their affiliations. As their numbers mounted in Chicago, New York, Detroit and elsewhere, they might have swelled the ranks of the Party in all the great American cities.

What was more, the Party was in a strategic position to receive all these new voters. It had not been responsible for the war or for the peace. It claimed credit for industrial prosperity and also for the humanitarian services during the war of some of its leaders like Herbert Hoover. Finally, it needed an issue to replace the bloody flag which no longer stirred the emotions as it had in post-Civil War days.

ALIENATING MINORITIES

Yet one by one, and almost without forethought, the G.O.P. antagonized all of these groups. By the end of the decade it had effected the thorough transfer of their loyalties to the Democratic Party.

The means by which it achieved this feat were disastrously simple and, in retrospect, clear-cut. First, having committed itself to opposition to the League of Nations, the Party found itself increasingly drawn along an isolationist path. At the same time, it adopted as its own the Red scare—originally a device of Democratic politicians. Finally it became identified, in many states, with the Ku Klux Klan—also originally a product of the Democratic South.

These choices led the Party into the espousal of policies that progressively alienated potential support among the "minorities." Isolation bred xenophobia, and that turned the Republicans to vigorous sponsorship of the movement to restrict immigration. In the years between 1919 and 1924, Republicans were the most active and most forceful proponents of the measures that finally became a part of American law and ended the long history of immigration. It was they who spoke for the national origins quota system, and their votes enacted it into law.

Furthermore, the debate over immigration policy tempted Republican leaders into statements of active hostility against precisely those southern and eastern Europeans who might have been their most potent sup-

porters. "Whose Country Is This?" asked Calvin Coolidge in a widely-read magazine. His own answer implied that it was certainly not that of the Italians or the Poles. If the article helped strengthen Vermont's adherence to the G.O.P., it certainly did not improve the position of the Party in Boston or Buffalo.

More disastrous still, the Party allowed itself to be identified with anti-Catholicism. In 1928, the prospect of gaining Southern votes for the first time since Reconstruction tempted some Republicans to participate in the undercover propaganda against Al Smith. The prejudice thus diffused had complex results. It weakened the moderate Catholics who had been urging upon their co-religionists a greater degree of integration with Americanism. Now it seemed that the only safety was in greater cohesiveness within the group.

Furthermore, the "Americans" were precisely the Catholics who had been closest in their relationships with the Republican Party. They were now decisively discredited; and the only security for the whole group seemed to lie in maintaining and developing its allegiance to the Democratic Party. There was a similar, though less marked, effect upon the Jews from the suspicions of Republican collaboration with the Klan.

It was perfectly true that Southern Democrats were as xenophobic, as anxious for immigration restriction, and as anti-Catholic as the Republicans. But the Southerners were far away in Georgia and Alabama and Mississippi, removed from contact with the masses of the foreign-born, the Catholics, and the Jews, while the Republicans were in Illinois and Ohio and Michigan and actively contested for local political control with the urban voters.

The alienation of the minorities was consolidated by Republican attitudes toward the developing depression after 1929. The minorities were at the bottom of the American social and economic scale and therefore most vulnerable to the effects of unemployment. The inability or unwillingness of the government to come to their assistance was a shock from which they were long not to recover. The Negroes were particularly affected. Through the decade of the 1920's,

they looked in vain for guidance from within their party as to the means by which they might rise and develop as a group. They learned only that states' rights and the rigid interpretation of the Constitution prevented the federal government from aiding them. Their only hope, they were informed, was meekly to essay to lift themselves by their own bootstraps.

As the depression destroyed that hope and led only to further degradation, it destroyed also the last shreds of faith that Republican Party affiliation might serve the group more faithfully in the future than it had in the past. After 1928, the Negroes deserted in ever larger numbers to the Democratic Party, not by virtue of what the Democrats had to offer, but out of complete and thorough disillusion with their rivals.

THE NEW DEAL

The shift was confirmed by the New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt and his immediate advisers were not, to begin with, sensitive to the problems of the "minorities" whose support they had, almost unwittingly, won. But they were sensitive to the problems of depression and unemployment; and as they provided the measures of initial relief, they began to cement the loyalties acquired in the years between 1928 and 1932.

Furthermore, by the end of the decade, the New Deal administration had begun to perceive some of the implications of its own conceptions of equality and to extend them in the form of positive governmental action in favor of the underprivileged groups. The war crises heightened the awareness of what yet remained to be done and further strengthened the alliance.

The weakness of the Democratic position derived from the prominence in the Party of Southern legislators and their control of Congress through the anachronistic committee system. That weakness was particularly apparent in the four years after 1948, when the expectations of many minority groups were disappointed again and again through Southern intransigence. That, together with discontent over the Korean War and the desire to further the liberation of Eastern Europe, swung an element, though

only a partial element, to support the Republican Party in the election of 1952.

The next four years were again years of opportunity for the Republicans. They had peace and prosperity and an immensely popular President. Moreover, substantial groups among the "minorities," having advanced economically and moved away to the suburbs, were eager for respectability and moderation. Such folk might permanently have changed their voting habits after 1952.

Again the Republicans missed the opportunity. Those who cast their ballots for Eisenhower did not shift their party allegiance. The national leadership made no significant effort to capitalize on its potential gains. The Negro received verbal encouragement but little indication of what practical aid a Republican administration might give him. The voters interested in immigration were similarly disheartened by the Watkins compromise on emergency refugee relief and by the Corsi case, both in marked contradiction to the President's position in 1952. Only blunders, more outrageous still, on the part of the Democrats, will swing a significant part of this electorate into the Republican Party.

In the light of these dismal events, it might well be asked, how the G.O.P. manages to persist.

It does so by retaining the allegiance of certain rural elements, traditionally Republican. Although these groups are dwindling in number, they remain dominant in many states through the failure to redistrict and through discrimination against urban areas in the legislatures.

The situation which assures the survival of the Party on that basis also condemns it to national ineffectiveness. These conditions breed politicians content with local control and oblivious to considerations that run beyond the county line. A narrow conservatism is their virtue and also their limitation. Suspicious of the cities, they cling together in the state legislatures; and when they move on to Washington they seek out the like-minded for affiliation. The common in-

terests of a farm bloc draws them into working collaboration with the Southerners whom they also court in national elections. A common resistance to the Twentieth Century also leads them and the Southerners to distrust the newer elements in our society.

A more sophisticated element also lingers in the G.O.P. through traditional commitments, through vestigial hatred of the New Deal, and through fear that it might not be able to exercise control among the discordant factions of the Democratic Party. The Dewey wing, as it is sometimes called, is oriented toward the eastern cities, through financial and social connections and through education. It is aware of the facts of life and anxious indeed to reach an accommodation of some sort with the newer elements in American society. But it has been consistently inhibited by the power, persistence and strength of its own rank and file. Even control of the Presidency has not given it control of the Party.

Therefore, it is likely the Republicans will remain a permanent minority in the United States. At exceptional moments they may be able to profit from the personal attractiveness of a military hero and edge their way into national office. But there is no indication that they have achieved, or are likely to achieve; the wider strength of deep popular roots. The tragedy is that the Party's failures have often considerably weakened its capacity for acting constructively either in the opposition or in power.

Oscar Handlin is the author of several books including the Pulitzer Prize-winner, THE UPROOTED, as well as numerous articles in many magazines. He has been elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Mr. Handlin has also received the John H. Dunning Prize awarded by the American Historical Association.

Oscar Handlin has pointed out that "... it is likely that the Republicans will remain a permanent minority in the United States. . . . There is no indication that they have achieved, or are likely to achieve, the wider strength of deep popular roots."

Yet Norman Graebner, analyzing prosperity and the Democratic Dilemma, sees clearly the problems of the Democrats, and concludes that "Perhaps only the collapse of one or both of the twin deities of moderation—peace and prosperity—could give the Democratic party a genuine rebirth as the nation's majority party."

The Changing Nature of the Democratic Party

BY NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

Associate Professor of History, Iowa State College

WILL ROGERS once observed that the Democratic party does its fighting before an election, the Republican party after victory has been achieved. As the Democrats moved into the 1956 campaign they appeared to be fulfilling their end of this arrangement with as much vigor as at any time in the past quarter century. The party's internal dilemma could be summed up under two heads—prosperity and civil rights. Together these forces continued to reverse the trend of the 1930's when depression and insecurity helped to build those Democratic majorities which dominated national politics for two decades.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's powerful coalition was the creation in large measure of the New Deal's vigorous response to the economic needs of millions of Americans who

in 1933 were the victims of unemployment or low income. For large numbers of distraught urban dwellers economic measures signified new hope and swept them into the party. Through five successive presidential campaigns from 1932 to 1948 the Democratic balance of power rested on their votes. So overwhelmingly Democratic were the huge urban returns that they overbalanced the normally Republican suburban, small-town and rural precincts of the heavily populated region from the Hudson to the Midwestern prairies. Even after 1940, when the leading issues confronting the American people were no longer economic, the Roosevelt coalition held together sufficiently well to elect Democrats to the White House.

In the defeat of 1952 the low income groups of the South, both rural and urban, and the Negro, Jewish, organized labor and urban minority voting blocs of the North continued to support the Democratic party. Unions with their broad coverage of the Democratic industrial base accounted for much of Adlai Stevenson's 44 per cent of the 1952 vote. Union allegiance had been achieved by the Democratic party through the Wagner Act and other New Deal measures of the middle 1930's which had strengthened the American Federation of Labor and had brought the C.I.O. into existence.

Even with the economy booming in 1952

Norman A. Graebner's book, *The New Isolationism*, is being published very shortly. He is also the author of *Empire on the Pacific*, published in September of 1955. Professor Graebner's articles have appeared in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, the *Pacific Historical Review*, the *Journal of Southern History* and *Inter-American Economic Affairs*.

at the highest level in American history and no prospect of a recession in sight, organized labor still believed that its economic future was more secure under Democratic than Republican leadership. By a four-to-one margin, union members agreed that their economic gains of the previous 20 years were greater than they would have been under the G.O.P. The old appeal that the Democratic party is "the friend of the working man" still bound the vast majority of union laborers to the party, but this was about the only direct appeal which the Democrats had left.

Time had done much to neutralize the perennial economic advantages of the Democratic party at the polls. Basically, by the early 1950's the party was suffering from a decade of unprecedented prosperity which made the former New Deal-type measures an anachronism for many voters who had once helped to pile up huge urban Democratic pluralities. For those Americans who had moved up the economic scale into the middle class the danger of depression and economic insecurity seemed remote. Instead, income taxes and inflation which devoured a large portion of the economic gains of the postwar period loomed as the immediate threat to their economic welfare.

Prosperous Americans had no need for a doting government and they resented a domineering one. In the expanding suburbs and the white collar districts of the cities resided millions of former Democrats whose economic and emotional ties to their party were disintegrating under the impact of prosperity.

Union spokesmen could no longer convince a prosperous nation that its chief concerns were economic. Nor was American business vulnerable in 1952 to union jibes. The essential role which industry had played in both the war effort and postwar prosperity now gave it heroic qualities. Big business was no longer a subject of criticism. Only in another depression would the American people respond to charges that business was responsible for the economic ills of the Republic.

Republican leadership successfully aggravated this Democratic dilemma. Through 20 years of defeat G.O.P. managers had be-

come educated to the fact that the American people as a whole accepted economic legislation as a normal aspect of the functioning of the American economy. Candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower promised to maintain the gains of the New Deal, assuring the nation that it would suffer no loss of economic security and that it would enjoy tax reduction and the halting of inflation besides. This campaigning effectively supplemented the general prosperity to render economic issues almost irrelevant and permitted the special issues of 1952—the Korean War, Communists in government and corruption—to dominate the campaign.

These powerful and disconcerting questions were the accumulation of 20 years of Democratic rule, a decade of prosperity and a cold war. Against such issues neither the unions nor the Democratic leadership had any defense. One major party defection produced by these new issues occurred among the urban ethnic minorities who were particularly vulnerable to Republican foreign policy appeals. They broke from the Democratic ranks in sufficient numbers to cut down the normal Democratic urban majorities and allow the metropolitan silk-stocking districts and the suburbs to counter-balance the urban vote.

It was particularly the issues related to foreign affairs in 1952 that supplanted the older economic appeals of the Democratic party for Eisenhower's heaviest gains were made in the most isolationist areas of the United States. Such symbols of Democratic iniquity as Yalta and Potsdam, plus the Korean War issue, aggravated the traditional isolationist emotions of the nation. Millions of Americans in 1952 were willing to believe that involvement in Korea had resulted from Communist intrigue in the State Department and the Foreign Service which allegedly had sold Chiang Kai-shek down the river, had brought Russian influence into the Pacific theater, and had invited the Communist invasion of South Korea. The continued attacks on Secretary of State Dean Acheson simply revived the former illusions that if the nation remained loyal to its traditions it would be invincible.

As soon as this new isolationist posture of the Republican leadership became obvious

in October, 1952, the German-American electorate, both Catholic and Protestant, swung heavily toward the G.O.P. Eisenhower's endorsement of Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner helped to bring this traditionally isolationist bloc into the Republican fold. Many German-Americans viewed the Korean War and the apparent failures of American policy in the postwar years as retribution for President Roosevelt's involvement of the nation in the struggle against Germany. By voting for Eisenhower they could settle old grudges dating back to the days of Hitler. Eventually this group supported Eisenhower three-to-one.

Korea and the related issue of Communist infiltration split the Irish vote, overwhelmingly Democratic in previous elections, right down the middle. The belief that Eisenhower would terminate the Korean War more quickly than could Stevenson, plus the dread of communism, overcame normal Democratic ties. One out of every three regular Irish Democrats bolted the party in 1952 as a rejection of past Democratic foreign policy.

Another fertile field for the Republican party was the normally Democratic Polish districts of the large cities. From the time that Poland came under the dominance of the Red Army in 1945, the Polish minority in the United States had viewed Russian purpose with alarm. Its deep anxiety for Poland's welfare made this important voting bloc especially susceptible to Republican charges that Roosevelt's wartime agreements were responsible for the destruction of Polish freedom. Cried one Polish-American leader of Milwaukee who supported McCarthy: "Yalta! Yalta! Many people here don't know if it's the name of a man or the name of an overcoat. But they do know they're against it and so is McCarthy and that's the way they voted."

So effectively did the Republican high command neutralize the economic appeals in the cities that it permitted the new issues to reduce immeasurably former Democratic urban majorities. Commuter areas around New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and Milwaukee actually pulled heavier Republican majorities in 1952 than the cities themselves gave to the Democratic party.

Eisenhower also captured the Midwest farm belt which Thomas E. Dewey had failed to do in 1948. His Kasson, Minnesota, speech, in which he assured 90 per cent of parity and expressed the hope that farmers would soon enjoy their full share of American prosperity (interpreted by many as a promise of 100 per cent of parity), offered a blue-plate special of continued economic security for the farmer and the luxury of voting Republican again. Such Republican assurances of continued government aid helped to usher millions of farmers back into the G.O.P. fold.

Farm policy, however, was only one factor in the Republican reconquest of the rural Midwest. "We're always willing to give the Democrats credit for the basic farm program," declared an Iowa farmer shortly after the election,

but the Democrats did other things we didn't like. There was all that scandal in Washington. There was a lot of inflation. Taxes went sky high. The Korean business didn't seem to get anywhere. When the elections came around last November, we voted for Ike because we thought it was time for a change and that we would make a good one. We knew he was for the farmer and he wouldn't—or couldn't—wreck the basic farm program. It's too well established.

Prosperity created a third major defection from Democratic ranks when it broke the solid South in 1952. This time Republican success stemmed not from such ephemeral issues as prohibition which had been used effectively in 1928, but from the South's economic revolution which began with the outbreak of World War II. Economic growth by 1952 had created an expanding middle class in the Southern cities and their suburbs, and had stratified the metropolitan areas of the South politically along economic lines as the depression had done to Northern cities in the 1930's.

A permanent Southern Republican party was in the making. Southern cities swung heavily toward the G.O.P. and gave Eisenhower most of the Republican gains in the South. In 13 Southern urban areas, Samuel Lubell has noted, Eisenhower received 12 per cent of the Negro vote, 40 per cent of the labor vote, and 70 per cent of the upper-

income returns. In capturing Tennessee, Virginia, Texas and Florida, the Republican party had capitalized on the economic changes in the South. The less prosperous rural areas remained predominantly Democratic.

THE NEGRO VOTE

Negro voters have become one of the most purposeful, driving forces in American politics. Since 1936 they have been an indispensable element in Democratic success, for they helped to build the large urban Democratic pluralities in the Northern cities. Even in 1952 Negroes voted almost 80 per cent Democratic, but under the dual impact of prosperity and civil rights this bloc appeared in 1956 to be wavering for the first time in two decades.

Negroes hold the balance of political power in such large Northern and Western cities as New York (which has more Negroes than Mississippi), Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, Kansas City, Cleveland and Cincinnati. Not more than a 15 per cent switch in Negro returns in 1948 would have carried Illinois, California and Ohio to Dewey. So rapid has been the migration of Negroes from the South into Northern cities that the political effect has become enormous. Negro votes gave Averell Harriman his margin of victory in New York in 1954. Said the *Wall Street Journal*, "In many states, a ten per cent shift among Negroes . . . could do much to offset farmer defection to the Democrats."

The issue of civil rights for Negroes has long accentuated the internal party cleavage between Northern liberals and the Dixiecrat wing of the Democratic party in the South. This Democratic split was accentuated in March, 1956, when 19 Senators and 81 Representatives from the South, led by Walter George of Georgia, termed the Supreme Court's unanimous anti-segregation decision of 1954 a "clear abuse of judicial power."¹ Immediately such Northern Democrats as Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman and Hubert Humphrey threatened to sign a resolution defending the Court. Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas averted an open

break when he assured the North that the Southern resolution was meant only for home consumption.

With the recent evolution of the segregation issue, the extremism of such Southern Democrats as Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi has threatened the hold of the Democratic party over the powerful Northern Negro electorate. Negro leaders are not in agreement on the extent of the revolt. Recently Roy Wilkins, N.A.A.C.P. Executive Secretary, told a Chicago audience that if the Negroes could not deprive Senator Eastland of the chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary Committee which controls all civil rights bills, they could do something about the success of the party that put him there. Republican leaders are reminding the civil rights conscious North that any Democratic vote is a vote for Eastland. Adam Clayton Powell, Negro member of Congress from New York City, has declared his preference for Eisenhower because he has made "the greatest contribution to civil rights in the history of the United States."

Other Negro spokesmen disagree. Congressman William L. Dawson of Chicago predicts that the old Democratic ties will outweigh the civil rights issue. He admits that Stevenson's statements on "gradualism" are not acceptable to many Negro voters, but he doubts if such dissatisfaction will drive many Negroes out of the Democratic party. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., of Detroit, the third Negro member of Congress, believes that the segregation issue has loosened the ties of Northern Negroes to the Democratic Party. Although he anticipates no wholesale desertion, he predicts that Democratic leaders who take an equivocal stand on the segregation issue will not receive Negro support.

The great hope of Northern Democrats is that the rebellion in Negro ranks appears to be working down from above. They anticipate that it will not go deep enough to influence the great bulk of Negro voters. Yet the moderate anti-Court views of such liberal Southern Democrats as John Sparkman and J. William Fulbright are embarrassing to Northern Democrats who are trying desperately to hold the Negro vote in line.

¹ For the complete text see page 116 of this issue.

Whether the Republican Party has much more than the personal Eisenhower appeal to the Negro vote is doubtful, for not all the economic problems of urban America have been resolved. Economic issues will continue to attract urban Negroes to the Democratic party. What G.O.P. spokesmen anticipate is enough exasperation among Northern Negroes so that they will vote against the South, segregation, and the recent trials and other Southern infringements of constitutional guarantees. One Baltimore Republican leader evinced this hope, but expected no more: "The Negro mind is so inflamed by what's happened that he's probably going to turn to the Republicans no matter what they do. He's going to vote against the Democrats, not for the Republicans."

Among Northern Democratic presidential candidates Averell Harriman, Governor of New York, appeared in mid-1956 the one best able to hold the Negro element to the party. In each episode of previous months in which Negro rights were at issue he had taken a stand pleasing to the Negro community. He had appointed Negroes to several important state posts. Negro leaders seemed to agree that Stevenson had lost status with his emphasis on "gradualism." One New York Negro spokesman said of Stevenson's declining popularity with Negro voters, "They feel he is pussyfooting and playing for Southern support." Some Negro leaders had praised Stevenson's efforts to hold the party together but they were not convinced that it could be done.

Eisenhower's record on civil rights gives the Republican party some positive attraction among Negro leaders. The President had little to do with the Supreme Court's anti-segregation decision, but he has received much of the commendation for it. He has been credited also with removing Jim Crow regulations from Washington's restaurants, theaters, bars and recreational facilities. In addition, he has appointed Negroes to important federal positions. One is Assistant Secretary of Labor, one is chairman of the Federal Parole Board, another is a White House administrative assistant, and others hold significant posts throughout the executive branch.

Such actions by a Republican administration will have some effect, but they can alter the Negro vote in large measure only if they overcome the normal economic appeals of the Democratic party to low income segments of the population. Present prosperity among Negro voters is therefore as vital a factor as the Republican appeal on civil rights. Urban Negroes are actually far better off economically than ever before. Their income has increased to the point where large American industries are competing vigorously for this new market. Ran Robert Bendiner's conclusion in his *Reporter* articles of May 31, 1956:

... present peace and prosperity are potent recommendations for any present government. Added to frustration over the Democratic Party's futile thrashing about on civil rights, they make the large Negro centers lush fields for Republican missionaries to cultivate.

It would seem that the Negro vote in 1956 would not go Republican nor would it turn out again to be 80 per cent Democratic.

MODERATION

In the past history of the United States, continued prosperity has had a tendency to create an aura of moderation in all phases of national political life—an enormous middle ground of complacency relative to both domestic and foreign policy issues. The present is no exception. Most Americans believe that both peace and prosperity are reasonably well grounded and they anticipate no need for change. So powerful has been the recent trend toward moderation that it has forced both major parties to ignore their extremists and gravitate toward a center position of comparative inaction where the gains of the past generation can be preserved but no new commitments undertaken.

Liberal Republicans, conservative Democrats, and independents who under the influence of prosperity seem to have rejected both the Old Guard Republicans and the Americans for Democratic Action, comprise the center of gravity in American political life. For them President Eisenhower and

those of both parties who support him reflect the popular mood of the day.

Any such militant quest for "normalcy," as in the 1920's, always undermines the effectiveness and the appeal of the Democratic party. This is quite natural. For the Democratic party, more than the Republican, stresses vigorous leadership and the positive state. Peace and prosperity seem to render both unnecessary. When times are good, people seek relief from crises, internal and external problems, and heavy governmental expenditures. Recent years of prosperity have gradually revolutionized the political outlook of the nation and have lessened the prospects of Democratic success in like measure.

Moderation, for example, has weakened the Democratic party and divided it internally on matters of foreign policy. Such liberal Democrats as Mike Mansfield, Humphrey, Fulbright, Stevenson and Harri-man have challenged the course of Eisenhower policy, demanding increased diplomatic flexibility to meet the post-Geneva challenge of Soviet tactics in the Middle East and South Asia. This group has consistently favored a broadened foreign aid program, especially for the Far East, but such expenditures are no longer popular and Congress has been reflecting the mood of moderation.

Southern Democrats such as Senator George and Congressman James P. Richards have taken the lead in repressing cold war expenditures, for, as conservatives, moderation has caught up with them also. Under Eisenhower in 1955, 38 per cent of the opposition to foreign aid came from Southern Democrats as compared with only 19 per cent in 1952. For those of both parties who have joined them, the issue is not economic but political. The nation could well afford more, but dangers from abroad seem far more remote than the sensitivity of many Americans to their economic interests and to high taxes. Southern conservative leaders, in addition, are far more in agreement with Eisenhower in matters of domestic policy than they are with the liberal Democrats in the North.

Republican managers understand the importance of prosperity and moderation in

their party's recent successes, for the expansion of the middle class represents the real Republican gain since the end of the Second World War. In 1955, over half the American families had incomes of \$4000 or more per year. The burgeoning middle income group, represented by the shifting center of political power from the cities to the suburbs, is the chief threat to the rebirth of Democratic political dominance. Economic issues competed with those of foreign policy in 1954 and the close vote indicates that prosperity has almost balanced the appeals of the two parties even on economic issues.

If the current business boom remains the underlying source of Democratic weakness, the Republicans seem determined to maintain it. They have sought to encourage reinvestment through liberal tax allowances. They have promoted the sale of houses and automobiles—the two essential commodities in the boom—through the laxest credit policies in American history. In 1955, many automobile companies were granting 36 months credit. That year the Republican administration increased the number of government-guaranteed mortgages, and two-fifths of those it made to veterans entailed no down payments.

In 1955, the installment debt reached 27 billion dollars, almost ten times the high of the 1920's. Credit sales had been extended to college tuition, airline travel and financial stocks. By every conceivable method the Republican leadership attempted to turn the American economy into an enormous spending machine to keep prosperity going.

If prosperity and Korea presented the challenge to the Democratic party in 1952, prosperity and civil rights comprise the threat to future success in 1956. Democrats, moreover, again seemed destined to face Dwight D. Eisenhower whose popularity, according to the pollsters, has not diminished since he entered the White House. Despite its lack of internal cohesion, however, the Democratic prospects in 1956 appeared little if any gloomier than four years earlier. Having been out of power during these years, the party would not be forced to contend with the powerful Republican issues of 1952—the Korean War, corruption and com-

munism in government. Nor could the Republican party again pursue the farm vote with promises of high parity prices.

Unquestionably the mood of moderation is highly beneficial for the Republican party, for its basic philosophy of negativism in government is well adapted to the national mood. But many important issues in American life remain unresolved. Continued peace and prosperity might make the average citizen oblivious to the nation's problems, but the refusal to face them has never succeeded in removing them. Somewhere in national political life there must be leadership which will face the challenges in external and domestic affairs.

There remains in 1956 much to be done in farm policy, in resolving minority problems, in city planning and slum clearance,

in expanding educational opportunities and civil rights—issues which Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has termed the “qualitative” goals of a prosperous nation for which problems of employment and security might be politically dead. It could be hoped that vigorous leadership might approach such issues successfully without the sobering experience of another depression. Foreign policy could well become the most debated question of 1956, but against the tide of moderation, in Congress and out, not even such issues, despite the need for their vigorous debate, offer much hope of arousing public interest. Perhaps only the collapse of one or both of the twin deities of moderation—peace and prosperity—could give the Democratic party a genuine rebirth as the nation's majority party.



“During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others, and should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government cannot be strong, that this government is not strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth. I believe it the only one where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern. Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this questions.”

—Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address, 1801.

"Studies of the voting behavior of Americans suggest that traditional family voting preference, religious affiliations and other associational ties exert an extremely important influence on political motivation. . . . The task of building political influence through a secure following thus promises to be difficult. But it remains the only feasible course for unions seeking to transfer the power inherent in organized labor to the political sphere."

The Political Role of Organized Labor

BY JACK CHERNICK

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AT EVERY important stage in the history of the American trade union movement, the role of unions in politics has been vigorously debated. Union leaders in each period debated the relative merits of alternative kinds of political action, seeking to determine how the unions' influence might most effectively be exerted. Labor's opponents have, as occasion required, exaggerated the influence of the trade union "colossus" or minimized the power of the leadership over the members; and other segments of the community have from time to time been concerned with the implications of trade union activity beyond the collective bargaining sphere.

The AFL-CIO merger in December, 1955, has given new prominence to the political role of unions. On the face of it the re-establishment of a single massive trade union federation would be expected to enhance the political influence of the labor move-

ment rather more than it would the economic power of the constituent national and international unions. The federation, at the national, state or city level, has always been the important instrument of union political action. As trade union leaders emphasized economic power and collective bargaining the federation took a back seat to the national union, the natural mechanism for exerting economic power.

Nevertheless, many have argued cogently that unification, as such, will not produce any substantial increase in union political influence. It may be true that unity will permit more concentrated lobbying pressure through minimizing differences of emphasis in legislation among top leaders of the two federations, and through the merger of some Internationals. But really decisive changes could occur only through changes in basic goals and in the machinery created to realize them. These include the priority that union leaders are prepared to assign to political activity over against routine servicing of the membership and collective bargaining; they include also the establishment of local machines for getting the members to the polls and inducing them to vote "right." These are the ultimate determinants of union political influence.

Two well-worn points have repeatedly been made in discussions of unions and political action. The first is that union activity in politics is not a recent phenomenon, that unions have always been in politics; the second, that it is a mistake to equate the increase in trade union membership with

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the ability of the leadership to deliver the vote of a labor "bloc." Labor has always been in politics, mostly with meager or even disastrous results for the continuity of the labor movement. But for much of the modern period, labor in politics has meant more or less vigorous lobbying pressure at the various levels of government, and occasional effective impact on the local, congressional or state political scene.

The significance of the increased size of organized labor in the last two decades lies in the potentiality of creating the kind of political machinery that will both overcome political apathy, which wage earners display in greater measure than other segments of the community, and increased identification of union members with the wider political goals of the leadership.

The goals of labor action in the political sphere have not changed fundamentally since the original AFL formulation which regarded political activity as subsidiary to collective bargaining and political tactics as appropriately confined to non-partisanship. It is certain that the labor movement is today as far from contemplating an independent labor party, with the avowed purpose of gaining control over the executive organs of government, as it was in Gompers' heyday. The Preamble to the original Constitution of the American Federation of Labor opened with the following paragraph:

Whereas, a struggle is going on in all the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between the capitalist and the laborer, which grows in intensity from year to year, and will work disastrous results to the toiling millions if they are not combined for mutual protection and benefit. . . .

In face of this, the Constitution proposed among other objectives, "To secure legislation in the interest of the working people and influence public opinion by peaceful and legal methods in favor of organized labor."¹

Some 70 years later, the Constitution adopted by the merged AFL-CIO has this to say about political objectives:

To secure legislation which will safeguard and promote the principle of free collective bargaining, the rights of workers, farmers and consumers, and the security and welfare of all the people and to oppose legislation inimical to these objectives.²

The Constitution furthermore creates a Committee on Political Education which is given the

duty and responsibility to assist the Executive Council in meeting the need for sound political education and in bringing about the effective implementation of the objectives . . . of encouraging workers to register and vote, to exercise their full rights and responsibilities of citizenship and to perform their rightful part in the political life of the city, state, and national communities.³

If it is taken that securing favorable legislation includes the effort to elect legislators favorable to the union program, neither ultimate goals nor fundamental techniques for achieving them have changed. What has changed is the sheer physical ability of trade unions to construct political machinery and to utilize it. Unions will continue to push for their goal of a favorable legislative climate by lobbying pressure on legislators; by attempting to influence the selection of candidates through pressure on political parties in primaries, and by local political deals; and by attempting to provide a foundation of strength for these pressures through winning a solid mass of support of trade union political objectives among trade union members.

What the increase in numbers from three or four million to 16 million members has permitted is the multiplication of the political workers whose activity in the precincts and in the wards affects, first, the registration and voting proportions and, secondly, the voting choices of union members. Whether this can be done effectively depends on the machinery established and on the political inclinations of union members.

Non-partisanship, the principle of eschewing the pursuit of power under a union political label, and the realities of American

¹ Constitution of the American Federation of Labor, Article 2, Section 4.

² Constitution of the AFL-CIO, Article 2, Section 5.

³ *Ibid.*, Article 13, Section 1 (c).

politics, force unions to exercise whatever political influence they possess through the Republican and Democratic parties. Both parties have been capable of absorbing union support because they are primarily "vote-getting mechanisms and have no firm ideological roots."⁴ By and large, however, the political energies and purposes of the labor movement have found a more congenial environment in the Democratic party. Thus, although insisting that endorsement and union support are always for specific candidates and not for the party, the unions have for the most part supported Democratic party candidates.

It is indeed difficult to see how any substantial segment of the union movement could see its way clear to effecting a working arrangement with the Republican party, at least at the national level, even apart from diametrically opposed positions on most domestic issues. For their part, Republican leaders have written off the possibility of any active support from the union leadership; on the assumption (not altogether unwarranted) that the union membership is not united in following the political recommendations of the leadership, the tactic has been to detach the member from the leader in voting behaviour.

The several attempts to restrict the unions in raising and spending funds for political action have been spearheaded by Republicans. The Taft-Hartley Act prohibition on the use of union general treasury resources in national election activity was followed, in 1955, by enactments in Wisconsin and New Hampshire which prohibit union contributions to the campaigns of any party or candidate. More recently, Senators Goldwater of Arizona and Curtis of Nebraska, both Republicans, have introduced a bill which would further restrict the device of voluntary contributions now used by the unions to raise funds for political action. In face of this, and inasmuch as official union position on endorsements and political direction comes from the union leadership, the likelihood of official relations with the Republican party is certainly slim.

Henry David has pointed out that because

vote-getting machines and the major parties achieve whatever unity they enjoy through compromise and not through dogma, "This policy gives American politics a disordered, illogical, and at times, even an irrational cast."⁵ In working within the Democratic party the union leaders have been prepared to compromise. They have recognized that the logical implications of non-partisanship force them to mold their policies and accept the compromises needed to join forces with other segments of the population.

But there are also limits to feasible compromise. It may be possible to overlook the implications for the living costs of urban wage earners, of farm subsidies in the form of higher price supports, and hence to go along with the Democratic farm program; again, it may also be possible, within the bounds of the coalition that is the Democratic party, to oppose the lifting of federal government regulation of natural gas prices. But it is growing more and more impossible to maintain a working compromise with the doctrine of segregation in public schools and with the civil rights compromise as a whole.

Indeed, the coalition with the Southern Democrats strikes at one of the primary justifications for the involvement of unions in politics—anti-union legislation in the form of state right-to-work laws. On the issue of state laws restricting unions, Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell has been able to argue "that a Republican election victory in 1956 represented the best way to safeguard workers' welfare." He was able to point, for example, to the fact that 114 of the members of Congress from states with laws prohibiting the union shop were Democrats and that only 37 were Republicans.

But perhaps even more serious is the threat that the unions see in the activities of the White Citizens Councils in the southern states to the foothold of union organization that has been won in the South. These councils are thought by the unions to represent as much an attempt to destroy Southern unionism as they are to protect the segregation system. But despite this, and in spite of the threat of southern locals to secede

⁴ Henry David, "One Hundred Years in Politics," in *The House of Labor*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 110.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

from parent Internationals, top union leaders have been pushing the civil rights program enunciated in the AFL-CIO Constitution and have passed resolutions supporting desegregation in the public school systems of the South.

The Textile Workers, despite the probable consequences for its already difficult task of organizing Southern plants, rejected the pleas of Southern local delegates when it passed a strong resolution at its 1956 convention in favor of civil rights. At the same time George Meany was telling the Convention of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union that "Labor has to go all the way in defending civil rights."

UNION POLITICAL ACTION

In view of this, it is expected that delegates from the unions will press with all the strength they can command in the 1956 Democratic convention for uncompromising civil rights and anti-segregation planks in the party platform. According to Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer of the United Automobile Workers, "such a walkout by the conservative southerners would make the Democratic Party a truly liberal one. . . . The idea of a Senator Eastland being in the same party with Senator Wayne Morse is ridiculous."

If, in fact, the unions can induce the kind of split in the Democratic party which some leaders apparently feel is necessary, not only will they have demonstrated more vote-getting power than professional politicians are even now ready to ascribe to them, but, equally important, they will work a truly revolutionary change in the fabric of our party politics. They will have led to emphasis on ideology and principles in a degree that has not been thought possible since Franklin D. Roosevelt put together his anomalous coalition.

In the American political system, the sinews of political power are to be found either in the ability directly to deliver voting strength at the polls or to contribute substantially to campaign funds. With the decision to participate more intensely in politics, the unions concentrated on realizing the potential voter adherence thought to exist in

the union membership. The ability to support favored candidates by direct financial contribution has been limited. To implement the former, the CIO established a Political Action Committee in 1943; the AFL in obvious response to the Taft-Hartley Act organized its political arm in 1947—Labor's League for Political Education. Both were national headquarters agencies with small staffs and with the function of sparking political action among affiliated international unions and state and local union federations. In some cases organized units were geared to congressional districts.

With the merger, the separate committees were combined to form COPE—Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO. George Meany was named chairman, and the former directors, James McDevitt of LLPE and Jack Kroll of PAC, were designated co-directors. Unification has thus far, for the most part, affected only the national committee and its operations; combination at state and local levels will await the more significant merger of the respective federations at those levels.

In some few cases AFL and CIO units joined forces for political action even before the merger and these will no doubt be strengthened and multiplied. By and large, however, it may be expected that below the national level, campaign activity will continue in most areas to be directed separately, at least until December, 1957.

The work of the PAC and LLPE consists of raising funds by means of voluntary contributions; preparing material in the central office for distribution throughout the ranks of organized labor; and facilitating the organization and performance in local and regional bodies of the job of political education among rank-and-file members. In some areas unions have established organizations geared to an intensive and systematic effort to induce union members to register and vote. Lists of union members are secured; members are then approached, generally by mail, but often personally, in an effort to ensure a high volume of registrations. On election days an intensive effort is made to get union members to vote by supplying transportation, baby-sitting, and so forth.

In respect to techniques of getting out

the vote, the union political arms have adopted the time tested methods of the political machines. However, the basic approach of the trade unions to political action marks a departure from the traditional methods by which professional politicians win allegiance. In principle, the leaders of the movements seek to promote the idea that the interests of trade union members cannot be fully satisfied by economic means; that many objectives of the union member as a wage earner and a citizen can be satisfied only by joining forces with other segments of the community to secure favorable legislation and government administration.

This implies a more rational foundation for inducing political interest and adherence than has characterized regular party tactics. It follows from this principle that support for, or opposition to, particular candidates is to be secured by demonstrating that a given candidate does or does not favor a program which meets the interests of the union member. Hence, the emphasis on the voting records of office holders, and hence, also, the relative concentration on issues.⁷

It may be noted that in part this approach to tactics and principle is dictated by the fact that trade union members do not automatically follow the political direction of union leaders through deep identification with the unions to which they belong. Moreover, the trade union movement cannot hope to overcome political indifference and secure voting adherence by creating the ward politician of the older school. Without access to patronage, and relying, at best, on part-time political workers at the ward and precinct level, the unions cannot count on winning over their members on the basis of personal favors performed or promised.

It has already been pointed out that the ultimate political influence of unions depends on the degree of unanimity that can

be reached among the union leaders on political policy and on the extent to which the union political organizations can demonstrate the adherence of union members. On both counts it must be stated that actual union influence falls far short of the potential suggested by the size of the trade union movement.

In the first place, inasmuch as the heart of political action is at the local, state and congressional levels, the variety of circumstances confronted by local and international unions has historically meant wide differences in the emphasis placed on political activity and on the techniques for achieving political influence. It is, for example, not possible to contemplate federation-wide acquiescence in any plan for more complete identification with the Democratic party or even for endorsement of its presidential candidates. In scattered, but important cases, union leaders have supported the Republican party; more often they have supported individual Republican candidates.

It is equally unlikely that unanimity can be reached on the priorities to be assigned various legislative objectives. Sectional and industrial economic objectives produce disagreements in all but the most general statement of legislative program. An instance of such lack of agreement among top labor leaders was recently reported. Senator Paul Douglas had occasion to complain that in his effort to arrange for hearings on the extension of the Minimum Wage Law, "his chief trouble comes from the fact that various sections of the labor movement are demanding immediate attention" to a variety of different legislation without agreement on priority of each. This was a reflection of a dispute between George Meany and Richard J. Gray, President of the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department. The disagreement apparently touched on the immediate interest of the building trades in securing Taft-Hartley Act amendments affecting building construction.

Of even greater significance for the long run political influence of unions is the prevalence either of political apathy or of opposition of union members to the political objectives formulated by the leadership. The proposition that the interests of the rank-

⁷ In a study of voting behaviour in the 1952 presidential election it was found that: "While union people did not differ from the rest of the population in the extent of their concern with parties or candidates, they were clearly more likely to be concerned with issues." Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 154. It is impossible, of course, to determine from the study whether the tendency disclosed showed the effects of union political activity or whether on the other hand union tacticians have simply been accurate in gauging the interest of union members.

and-file cannot be entirely fulfilled through collective bargaining, that many goals can be achieved only through political activity, and this through the union, flies in the face of the value system that has sustained "business unionism" in the United States.

The trade union member has apparently accepted the idea that the employer cannot be relied upon to meet the workers' needs without pressure. This is not to imply that the employer is regarded as unalterably opposed to the workers' interest, but the union is a necessary device for concentrating the strength which workers do not possess as individuals and applying the pressure as occasion demands.

For the union member and the union institution to adopt political action as a goal equal in emphasis to that of economic goals sought through collective bargaining, requires the substitution of a different set of values. It requires acceptance of the idea that the employer belongs to an opposing political grouping; it implies taking common cause with non-wage earners in political objectives. It might also, under circumstances in which proximate control of the organs of government is won, imply conflict between broad community objectives and union objectives. This value conflict has been regarded as one of the bases for the traditional selection by trade unions of the pressure group concept of political action.

Stabilized collective bargaining provides a common ground of interest between workers and employers concerned with material problems and jobs and income in particular plants, occupations, industries, or even localities or regions. On broad, remote issues of public policy, wage earners divide up along differing lines of personality identification, race, religion, geography, or nationality. They tend to forget their common interests with employers in improving the immediate competitive level of wages and the stability and desirability of employment.⁸

Scattered studies of union member attitudes have demonstrated that there is by no means universal acceptance of the principle that unions ought to engage in political activity. As an example, reference may be made

to a study of attitudes of union members in one of the districts of the United Steelworkers of America. Although 88.6 per cent of the members and 97.3 per cent of the union officers thought that the Steelworkers' Union had made the company a better place to work; and 72.2 per cent of the entire group and 87.5 per cent of the union officers regarded the Steelworkers' Union as "my organization," only 26.5 per cent of the entire membership of the district thought that the "union must spend more time and money on political activities in order to continue to improve the welfare of the members." On the other hand, 61.8 per cent of union officers were ready to accept increased union political activity.⁹

The political tactics of active union groups have been based on the assumption that if union members can be induced to register and vote, they will, in large proportion, vote in favor of the union endorsed candidate—the assumption that union members as workers will follow the tradition of voting for "liberal" candidates. But union leaders have also become aware that the assumption is not always valid. There is the evidence that trade union families switched in significant numbers from Democratic to Republican in voting for presidential candidates between 1948 and 1952. Often pointed to is the victory of Senator Taft in Ohio, in 1950, despite strong official opposition by the state CIO and AFL.¹⁰

Similar conclusions have been drawn from surveys of trade union members. In one study of 21 local unions in a district of the International Machinists, the authors found that union members disagree among themselves about union activity in politics; and "to the extent that the members studied are representative, it would appear that the immediate political power of unions at the polls is fairly limited."¹¹ The survey disclosed a lack of positive endorsement for the union's political activity rather than strong

⁹ United Steelworkers of America, *Union Member Attitude Survey* (Pittsburgh: 1956) Table 7. The study was conducted for the Steelworkers' Union by the Union Research and Education Program of the University of Chicago.

¹⁰ See Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (2nd ed.; Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), pp. 201-207.

¹¹ Ruth Alice Hudson and Hjalmer Rosen, "Union Political Action: The Member Speaks," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3, April 1956, p. 27.

⁸ Avery Leiserson, "Organized Labor as a Pressure Group" in *Labor in the American Economy* (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1951), p. 113.

disapproval, although the members would disapprove of being told for whom to vote.

On the other hand, in circumstances which permit the union member to tie together more or less directly his interests as a union member and legislative needs, his political tendencies are much more responsive to the union's urging. For example, it is reported from the local union involved in the recent Perfect Circle Company dispute, which brought with it picket line violence, injunctions and the National Guard, that members, through their financial contributions, demonstrated increased support for political action. It is stated that prior to the strike the most that the local had ever collected in a political action dollar drive was \$15. After the strike, however, the local's 180 members donated \$280 to the COPE Political Education Fund.¹²

Studies of the voting behavior of Americans suggest that traditional family voting preference, religious affiliation and other associational ties exert an extremely important influence on political motivation. It appears that for rank-and-file members, union affiliation is not sufficiently strong, in many cases, to overcome opposing political inclinations derived from the broader community. As union organization expands into unorganized areas new members are likely to be drawn from white collar groups whose political inclinations have been even farther removed from the kinds of controls that the union program implies.

A final problem which deserves to be mentioned is the increasing importance of the mass communication media as campaign tools. One aspect of this problem is that the political literature of COPE and of other union political organs is likely to be a weak competitor of television and radio in the attempt to exert an impact on union members. Nor does it seem likely, if past results are taken as a guide, that enough can be raised in voluntary contributions to compete effectively through purchase of television and radio facilities.

The task of building political influence through a secure following among the rank-and-file thus promises to be difficult. But it remains the only feasible course for unions seeking to transfer the power inherent in organized labor to the political sphere.

Recent events do not appear to have substantially altered either the ultimate political goals of the trade union movement or the primary tactics for realizing them. To a large extent union political activity may still be characterized as an extension into the legislative field of the basic economic goals of collective bargaining. Issues such as the size of unemployment insurance benefits are regarded as requiring a two-pronged attack: what cannot be secured through political activity is pressed in collective bargaining and vice versa. However, a review of the content of union political programs and of the policy position taken by most unions on national issues reveals a range of interests much wider than the economic goals of trade union members: the concern, for example, with the nation's foreign policy and its role in the free world coalition; or the predominant official support of free international trade (despite the opposition of unions in protected industries).

Whatever the ultimate ability of the trade union movement to influence government policy, union political activity contributes to the effective functioning of our democratic system. Through its political program it injects into the ideological streams from which economic and social policy emerge, the views and aspirations of a large and important segment of the population.

Through grass roots political action the unions increase the participation of union members in the democratic process in local communities and in the nation. All this may strengthen the hand of the leadership in dealing with other power groups; but it may also prove a vehicle to the greater exercise by union members of the right to shape union policies and to share in the conduct of union affairs.

¹² *Ammunition*, United Automobile Workers, April 1956, p. 27.

"Farmers have been slow to face up to their declining political power, and the noise made by farm leaders has actually camouflaged the growing political weakness of farmers.

. . . However, farm political power is much stronger than the ratio of farmers to the total population would seem to warrant."

The Changing Political Role of the Farmer

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AS ONE looks back over the past 35 years, it is clear that scarcely any domestic political issue has been more important or persistent than the farm problem. With the exception of World War II and the immediate post-war years, farmers and their spokesmen since 1920 have consistently pressed a wide variety of demands upon the federal government. There has been an increasing tendency to look to the nation's Capitol for aid in establishing and maintaining prosperity on American farms. These well-known facts raise a number of interesting questions regarding the role of agriculture in American political life.

What has been the historic position of farmers in the American political system? Who has spoken for them in the past, and who speaks for them today? How effective are the voices which plead the cause of modern American agriculture? These are questions which command the attention of citizens who are honestly considering the

agricultural issue in current American politics.

At no time since the founding of the nation have farmers spoken through a single, united voice. Farmers were not united in the Nineteenth Century; they have not been united in the last few years and are not united today despite the windy talk about farm lobbies and farm blocs. An endless variety of farms and the many different kinds and classes of farmers have produced more diversity than unity in the political objectives of farmers and farm groups. For example, the current interests of a specialized wheat farmer in Kansas who is interested in high wheat prices is far different from those of a New York dairy farmer who wants to buy cheap feeds. Dairy farmers who desire high butter prices find themselves in conflict with cotton producers whose cottonseed oil goes into butter substitutes. To form a unified and effective political voice from the conflicting economic interests among farmers is the principal challenge facing the nation's farm spokesmen. The task is indeed formidable when one remembers that there are over three and one-half million commercial farmers in the United States who produce something over 200 commercial crops. The problem of achieving farm political unity is one which would tax the most ingenious agricultural leadership.

On the eve of the Civil War farmers and people living in rural areas made up about

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84 per cent of the total population and, in general, they made their demands known through the regularly elected senators and representatives in Congress. Passage of the Homestead Act in 1862 is a good example of federal legislation which a large element of farmers demanded, legislation which they hoped would be of benefit to American agricultural interests. Although a fairly small group, wool growers were able to exert pressure on Congress in the pre-Civil War years to get a substantial tariff on wool imports. These and other laws which were demanded by sections of the rural population did not result from pressure by special farm groups. They were placed on the statute books by senators and representatives whose constituency was predominantly rural.

EARLY ORGANIZATIONS

Despite their numerical dominance in pre-Civil War America, farmers were by no means satisfied with their condition. They frequently complained of low farm prices and of high prices charged by merchants for non-farm commodities. They criticized the banking system and attacked the railroads. However, no genuine farm movement developed before the 1860's. Occasionally, someone urged farmers to be more active politically if they expected Congress to heed their wishes, but that is about all. For instance, Professor J. B. Turner of the University of Illinois wrote in 1858:

Let us besiege our Legislature and besiege Congress, and give no peace till they properly attend to all those interests of agriculture, which they now profess to attend to, and undertake all other enterprises which we so much need.

Advice of this nature, however, went largely unnoticed and farmers did not create any special organizations to promote their particular interests until after the Civil War.

The National Grange, established in 1868, was the first general farm organization founded in the United States. Formed during a period of low prices following the Civil War, the principal objectives of the Grange were to improve the social and economic welfare of rural people through organization and cooperation. However, the

Grange turned to politics in the early 1870's and was largely responsible for the so-called Granger Laws which were designed to regulate railroads and other corporations. The political influence of the Grange was short-lived, however, and after the middle 1870's it had relatively little force in politics until it became active politically during the 1920's, nearly half a century later.

Meanwhile, the Greenback Movement was organized with both farm and labor support to promote the idea of solving some of the economic problems through inflationary legislation. The Greenbackers, who reached their height in the midterm elections of 1878, demanded that the federal government increase the money supply by printing and distributing greenbacks. Although the Greenback Party ran a presidential candidate as late as 1884, it had already declined as a political force.

The farm discontent of the late Nineteenth Century was caused to a large extent by the long period of low prices between 1868 and 1896. But farmers also complained of deflation and the scarcity of money, high interest rates, railroad abuses and many other things. The smoldering dissatisfaction culminated in the organization of the Northern and Southern Alliances in the 1880's, and the Populist Party in 1892. Western and southern farmers found a voice for their grievances in the Populist Party which sought to relieve farm ills by legislative action.

The Populist program included free and unlimited coinage of silver, government ownership of telephone and telegraph lines, an income tax and many other reforms. Although the Populists failed to gain political control, they became strong enough to throw a scare into the old parties. Both the Democratic and Republican parties came to support principles advocated by the Populists and their rural supporters. It should be noted that during the Populist uprising, the Grange did not play a prominent political role.

In the post-Civil War generation farmers sought to achieve their objective through third party organizations. Believing that the Democratic and Republican parties were both corrupt and under the influence of

special business and industrial interests, farmers tried to make a clean political sweep. Failing in this, they experienced the frustration of realizing their numerical superiority, yet being unable to make their superior numbers pay off in terms of governmental control. Lack of organization and unity in purpose, and disagreement over means of achieving their objectives plagued farmers as they worked to enlarge their political influence to a place where it would be commensurate with their numbers.

Except for the Nonpartisan League which was confined largely to North Dakota, there was no large-scale, organized attempt by farmers to influence governmental policies between the late 1890's and the early 1920's. Nonetheless, Congress was attentive to the needs and demands of agriculture, and passed several pieces of far-reaching legislation to help farmers. One of the most notable of these was the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916. In any event, the good times from 1898 to about 1912 and the high prices of farm products created by huge wartime demands in 1917 and 1918 dulled the farm militancy so characteristic of the agrarian uprising of the 1880's and 1890's. The National Farmers Union was formed in 1902, but like the Grange, its emphasis at this time was less on political action and more on education and cooperation.

The postwar agricultural depression which began in 1920 stimulated a strong demand among farmers for some kind of federal action to help solve the ills of agriculture. By this time there were three general farm organizations, all national in scope, which were dedicated to caring for farm interests in Washington and elsewhere. Besides the Grange and the Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation was founded in 1919, and early the next year it established a Washington legislative office in charge of Gray Silver. The Grange and Farmers Union also kept representatives in Washington either full or part time by the early 1920's. With three national farm organizations active, the average dirt farmer could reasonably expect that Congress would listen when organized agriculture spoke.

But if the sons of the soil expected that they would now have a single, united voice

in Washington, they were doomed to disappointment. From the early 1920's to the present time there has been a weakening lack of unity among the organizations which are supposed to speak for the nation's farmers. The National Grange has for many years been strongest among the dairy farmers, and the fruit and vegetable growers. The organization's largest membership developed in the northeastern states and in the Pacific Northwest, and it has been essentially conservative in its approach to solving farm problems.

On the other hand, the Farmers Union found its greatest strength in the Great Wheat Belt from Texas in the South to the Dakotas in the North. It has been characterized by militant leadership, especially under John A. Simpson, who was president in the early 1930's, and the current president, James G. Patton. It represents the Left Wing of the farm movement. One of the Union's most cherished objectives has been to maintain the rather loosely defined family-size farm, and many of its members always have been among low income farmers.

The Farm Bureau gained its greatest strength in the Corn Belt—from Indiana west to Minnesota—and among the cotton producers in Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas and other sections of the central South. Corn and cotton farmers have made up a large percentage of the Farm Bureau's membership.

DISCORDS

The three major farm organizations were made up of farmers specializing in different crops, and to some degree each tended to dominate a particular geographic region. Moreover, each of the organizations have had sharp internal conflicts, not only in the 1920's, but down to the present time. Thus the old problem of getting a united political voice for farmers is still unsolved.

The lack of unity among farmers and their organizations was well demonstrated in the fight over the McNary-Haugen bills during the 1920's. No other farm legislation so gripped the imagination of farmers in the Harding-Coolidge era. The main idea

behind this scheme was to remove the price-depressing effect of surplus crops on domestic prices by segregating the amount produced in excess of domestic consumption, and permitting the domestically marketed commodities to rise behind a tariff wall.

The surpluses were to be sold abroad for whatever they would bring and any losses sustained on exports were to be paid from a tax on each unit of a commodity sold. This was called an equalization fee. By this means it was hoped to increase farm prices enough to give them a "fair exchange value" with industrial products. This was the parity concept which was later written into the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

When the McNary-Haugen bill was first introduced in 1924, the major farm organizations were sharply divided over it. For example, Oscar E. Bradfute of Ohio, who became president of the Farm Bureau in 1922, strongly opposed any government tinkering with the farm price mechanism. He believed that cooperative marketing would solve farm ills. On the other hand, Sam H. Thompson, Charles Hearst and other leaders of the Farm Bureau threw their support behind passage of surplus-control legislation. Likewise, there were those in the Farmers Union and Grange who both supported and opposed the McNary-Haugen bill. This internal division and conflict within the various farm organizations left the farmers with many voices, none of which were powerful enough to command obedient attention in Washington.

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURE

To remedy this difficulty a number of farm leaders got together in St. Paul in July, 1924, and organized the American Council of Agriculture. The main purpose of creating a new organization was to provide one which could devote itself strictly to national farm legislation, especially the McNary-Haugen bill, and which would cut across party and farm organization lines. It was hoped by this means to avoid the jealousies, bickerings, and differences within and among the regular farm organizations, a condition which had greatly weakened

their influence. The main objective of the American Council of Agriculture, said the Declaration of Purpose, was

to make it possible for the existing agricultural organizations of whatever character to speak with one voice through a united leadership wherever and whenever the general well-being of agriculture is concerned.

George N. Peek, who headed the Council, claimed that he represented some 2.5 million American farmers. Before long offices were set up in Chicago and Washington, money was solicited, and strong pressure was brought to bear on Congress to pass the McNary-Haugen bill. Never before had farmers been so ably and powerfully represented in Washington. Peek and Chester C. Davis were among the most effective workers, although they received support from some of the leaders in the regular and other special farm organizations.

Modern farm lobbying really dates from middle 1920's when those who favored the McNary-Haugen bill organized to push their measure through Congress. For the first time, substantial sums were raised for the special purpose of passing particular legislation. Scattered and incomplete records in the files of Chester C. Davis show that the special farm groups spent around \$50 thousand between 1924 and 1928 on salaries, literature, travel and other items. The Farm Bureau, Grange and Farmers Union spent thousands of dollars more through their state and national offices.

The power of the farm lobby became clear when the McNary-Haugen bill was passed over stiff administration opposition. Tremendous pressure was turned on reluctant congressmen and senators. For instance, when Representative Charles E. Fuller of Illinois indicated he would not vote for the bill, Chester Davis asked an Illinois farm leader: "Will it be possible for you to see that a particularly warm fire is lighted under him in his own district?" The political fire was indeed lighted and Fuller voted for the measure.

Just before Congress voted on the 1928 bill, one congressman said that he must vote for it even though it was against his better

judgment. "I am for it," he said, "I have got to support it, because the crowd at home are on my trail." The *Wichita Beacon* claimed that a majority had been obtained for the bill "under the bludgeoning of one of the most persistent and skillful lobbies ever seen in Washington."

This may have been an exaggeration, but, in any event, there was no question but that farmers were better organized and spoke with more authority on governmental matters affecting their interests than ever before.

After President Coolidge vetoed and killed the McNary-Haugen bill in 1928, the American Council of Agriculture and some of the other special farm organizations ceased to exist. Again farmers had to rely chiefly upon the Big Three. The constant conflicts among these groups, however, continued to weaken their efforts on behalf of farmers. The closest which the Grange, Farm Bureau and Farmers Union came to agreement was at a National Agricultural Conference held in Washington in January, 1932. By that time the severity of the depression had practically forced the major farm organizations to join hands, and "it was the first time in the history of organized agriculture," said one writer, "that the 'big three' have ever reached unanimous agreement on a project of such momentous significance to the industry." The conference agreed that the Agricultural Marketing Act should be amended by adding the equalization fee or export debenture plan.

UNITY IN PARITY

The critical situation in agriculture by 1933 brought a fair degree of unanimity among the farm organizations, although many agricultural spokesmen opposed the acreage restriction provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. However, there was general agreement on the principle of parity prices which would give the producers purchasing power equal to that which they had received in the base period from 1909 to 1914. Ever since 1933, the major farm organizations have stood firmly behind the parity principle despite sharp differences of opinion whether farmers should get 100, 90, or some lesser per cent of parity.

Although the Grange, Farm Bureau and Farmers Union have continued to be agriculture's main political spokesmen, these organizations too often spend more time and energy fighting one another than they do trying to work together to solve general farm problems. The Farmers Union claims to speak for about 750 thousand farm families. In recent years under the energetic leadership of James G. Patton, the Union has fought unceasingly for "mandatory federal farm income protection legislation at 100 per cent of fair parity for the family farm production of all farm commodities." The Farmers Union has also urged setting up a national food allotment plan similar to the stamp plan of New Deal days.

On the other hand, the more conservative Farm Bureau which represents some 1 million farm families has bitterly opposed high rigid price supports. It was the Farm Bureau which backed most strongly the flexible price support plan adopted by the Eisenhower Administration in 1954. The principle of flexible supports was based on the belief that farmers would cut down the production of surpluses voluntarily if they were threatened with lower support prices in the event of continued excessive surpluses. Although the history of farm production emphatically refutes this concept, it has been popular in some quarters. In order further to reduce surpluses the Farm Bureau has promoted the "soil bank" plan which is currently the center of national attention.

The Grange has not given its full support to the views held by either the Farmers Union or the Farm Bureau. Speaking of the opposing views of the other major farm organizations over rigid and flexible price supports, Master Herschel D. Newsom said early in 1956: "The Grange is standing more or less aside while these two opposing viewpoints battle it out." The Grange has placed heavier emphasis upon restoring foreign markets for American surpluses.

This emphasis has caused the organization to revive the old Domestic Allotment Plan advocated in 1931 and 1932 by Henry A. Wallace, Dr. John A. Black, M. L. Wilson and others. Now called the Domestic Parity Plan, the Grange believes that a two-price plan should be implemented, at least for

wheat. Under this arrangement, that portion of the crop consumed at home would be supported at the parity price, but the surplus would go to world markets at the world price.

Enough has been said to show that today, as in the past, farmers lack a strong, united voice in governmental affairs. This situation is no different than it has been for over a century, but today the differences among farm leaders and organizations create a more serious problem than ever before. This is true because of the very rapid decline in farm population. In 1910, for example, 34.9 per cent of the American people still lived on farms; by 1954 farm population had dropped to 13.5 per cent.

DECLINING INFLUENCE

The political implications of a rapidly declining farm population are of utmost importance for agriculture. It is true that during the last 30 years farmers have become much better and more powerfully organized. They have pressed their demands upon Congress with greater vigor and persistence than ever before. But while farmers have been improving organizational methods by which they can gain attention from the federal government, time and the great city migration have been working against them. As more people leave the farms—and 2 million more left in 1952 than returned—politicians have less and less to fear from an aroused and angry rural population when the country as a whole is considered.

Farmers have been slow to face up to their declining political power, and the noise made by farm leaders has actually camouflaged the growing political weakness of farmers. The farm organizations secretly and fearfully recognize the situation, but only infrequently do they bring the matter into the open. However, Homer L. Brinkley, Executive Vice President of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, said early in 1956 that

the lessening political influence of farmers may be forecast by the declining number of farms and the growing population trends toward cities and urban areas.

He urged support of the idea presented in Congress that the electoral college system be revised in such a way that farmers would have a disproportionate influence in presidential elections. It has been reported that the major farm organizations plan to present a more united front through regular meetings of their representatives in Washington. Herschel Newsom, Master of the Grange, said that many views held by the different organizations could not be reconciled, but he added: "If the farm minority is going to cope with the power of other groups, it must present a united front wherever possible."

Thus a few farm leaders are openly recognizing that the long period during which agriculture was politically strong by sheer weight of numbers is a thing of the past. And it should be emphasized that the major farm organizations are not actually as strong politically as they seem to be. Most farm organization members join because of some particular service which the organization provides, rather than because they believe the organization will best represent their political interests in Washington. One of the chief drawing cards is the privilege farmers have to buy cheap insurance. Without this many local units of the Big Three would not even exist.

Despite what has been said, however, farm political power is much stronger than the ratio of farmers to the total population would seem to warrant. This is true because, first of all, the Constitution guarantees each state two United States senators and the most rural state is equally represented in that legislative body. Furthermore, there is still a very strong feeling of agricultural fundamentalism in this country, even among city dwellers who would not think of living or working on a farm. The idea that farming is somehow more pure and virtuous than other occupations and that farmers are God's chosen people is widely believed today as well as in the days of Jefferson.

Then there is another aspect of what is labeled "agricultural fundamentalism." Millions of Americans subscribe to the idea that agriculture is "the base of the economic pyramid" and that the nation's prosperity rests upon a prosperous agriculture. This

was one of the great cries of the 1920's and the 1930's as friends of agriculture sought federal aid. It may be a doubtful assumption in the 1950's, but President Eisenhower repeated it in his farm message to Congress on January 9, 1956. He referred to agriculture as "our basic industry," and called "economic reversals of farmers" "a direct threat to the well-being of all our people."

It must be remembered that millions of Americans are only one generation, or less, removed from the farm, and many of these people have a nostalgic affection for their childhood experiences and homes. In addition, large numbers of city people still own farms and therefore have a personal interest in agriculture's welfare. The 13.5 per cent of Americans who live on farms are not alone in fighting the farmers' battles.

This brief discussion of the changing role of farmers in American political life points up at least one significant fact. The population make-up of the country has so changed within the last half century that farmers and farm leaders must reassess their political place and adjust themselves to a minority position. The success of this adjustment will be seen in how well farmers and farm leaders are able to achieve their political objectives. Despite their minority position, it appears that farmers will be able to wield a disproportionate political influence for many years to come because of the effectiveness of their organizations, and the structure of the federal and state governments. Farmers will be aided, too, by a widespread belief in agricultural fundamentalism and by a strong agrarian tradition.



"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart, you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.

"That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."

—Justice Holmes' dissent in *Abrams v. United States*, 1919.

"One has only to note the role of the suburban vote as an element in the political power balance in certain states to recognize its importance, actual and potential," comments the author, who believes that "the national verdict in 1956 may depend upon the intensity of the political convictions of the electorate in those counties which surround the great cities of the United States."

The New Suburbia

BY G. EDWARD JANOSIK

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Most notable among the unusual factors of the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections was the rapid expansion of that portion of the electorate popularly described as "suburban." The tremendous population shift responsible for the development of this new force in American politics resulted from the unplanned concatenation of three conditions in American society.

The first of the conditions was a swift and drastic change in the amount of and demand for residential construction. Hampered for years by the slackened demands of the depression years, impeded during the period of military emergency by shortages of material and labor, home builders in the post-war era found the situation suddenly reversed. In addition, governmental policy, as exemplified by the Federal Housing Authority and the Veterans Administration programs, had the effect of maintaining and enlarging a market for new housing which appeared insatiable.

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Contributing to the demand for housing was a substantial and continued increase in the birth rate. Not only were more families having children, but many families were having more children. What may have been a comfortable home for a family of four was considerably less comfortable for a family of six. Therefore, the desire to acquire "a little bigger house further out" became more intense and extended itself to great numbers of families.

Despite the undeniable urgency of these two factors, a third was necessary in order to support the momentum of suburban expansion. This was the high level of economic activity enjoyed by the nation during the post-war decade, which enabled many families to undertake and discharge substantial economic risks. A large number of families who wished to purchase larger homes had improved their financial position to the extent that they were able to obtain funds from private lending agencies rather than the F.H.A. or the V.A., for whose aid they were no longer eligible.

From 1952 to 1956 the same forces have been operating with undiminished vigor, and the potential influence of the suburbs has become correspondingly greater. A survey of demographic change during this four-year period in the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States shows a median increase of sixteen per cent in the population of 57 counties,¹ as compared to a national

¹ Completely urban counties such as Manhattan, Philadelphia, Cook, San Francisco, Suffolk (Mass.), Cuyahoga (Ohio), were not included in this tabulation.

increase of seven per cent.² Maryland's Montgomery County, located near Washington, D. C., showed the greatest proportionate growth, having a population increase of 41 per cent in a four-year span. Following were Johnson County in Kansas (Kansas City) with 38 per cent, Orange County in California (Los Angeles), 36 per cent, Jefferson Parish in Louisiana (New Orleans), 35 per cent. Bucks County in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) and Prince George's County in Maryland (Washington, D. C.) each showed an increase of 33 per cent.

The metropolitan areas with the largest proportionate increase were Washington, D. C., at 29 per cent, New Orleans, 27 per cent, and Los Angeles, 25 per cent. It should be noted that these gigantic population shifts are characteristic of metropolitan areas throughout the United States and that they are neither circumscribed nor localized. Mushrooming over the entire country, the new "suburbs" therefore become subject to the conflicting aspects of American politics.

A general characteristic of suburban areas is the relatively high income of the residents. Of the 57 counties involved in the survey, only ten had a median family and related individual income lower than the corresponding state figure. When the median family and related individual income figure for the 19 states involved in the survey was compared to the highest corresponding county figure, the latter was from 10 per cent to 100 per cent higher, with the median 33 per cent. Reasonably assuming that the fiscal habits of suburbanites are not unlike those of other Americans, it follows that the private indebtedness of the suburban population is considerable.

Qualified opinion exists to testify that between 99 per cent and 100 per cent of all housing built in the Pennsylvania region of the Philadelphia metropolitan area is mortgaged, much of it up to limits imposed by government policy upon lending institutions. It is not yet clear whether the expanded suburban areas will be markedly sensitive to the economic climate and reflect such sensitivity in their political behavior. Because of the delicate fiscal position of much

of the suburban population, the possibility exists.

Twenty-four of the congressional districts of the 20 largest metropolitan regions in the nation are composed wholly or preponderantly of suburban counties. In 1952, the Republican party captured 17 of these districts and only one less in 1954, despite the Democratic surge that year which gained control of both houses of Congress. The district lost by the Republicans was the New Jersey sixth which had formerly been held by Senator Clifford P. Case. Case carried the district in 1952 by a margin of 121 to 67 thousand, but in 1954 Democrat Harrison A. Williams, having won a special election in 1953, carried the district 85 to 67 thousand. In previous years Senator Case had attracted considerable support from liberals and labor, while in the 1954 election the Democrats nominated a candidate who appealed to these segments whereas the Republicans did not.

Democratic candidates for Congress in 1954 seemed to retain a greater portion of their electoral strength than did the Republicans, when the records are compared with two years before. However, in only one instance was this trend sufficient to win an election. To demonstrate, the three congressional districts made up of Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island turned in 375 thousand Republican votes in 1952 as compared with only 300 thousand in 1954, while the Democrats dropped from 190 thousand to 185 thousand. To what extent the decrease in the proportion of the party vote polled by Republican congressional candidates in 1954 is attributable to the slight economic recession in the summer of that year cannot readily be isolated, but it may have been a factor in the situation.

The political loyalties existing in suburban areas prior to the influx of new residents followed no particular pattern. Surrounding such metropolitan regions as Baltimore, Washington, D. C., New Orleans, Houston and Los Angeles there prevailed an allegiance to the Democratic party, while New York, Philadelphia and Chicago were encircled by predominantly Republican areas. Even, however, in suburban areas traditionally Democratic there has been evi-

² Bureau of the Census "Current Population Report," May 21, 1956, p. 4.

denced a tendency toward Republicanism. This is particularly true in those parts of Maryland and Virginia around Washington, D. C., where historical loyalties to the Democratic party have been supplanted. Of the 67 counties included by the Census Bureau in their classification of the 20 largest metropolitan regions in the United States, 51 were found to be in the Republican column in the 1952 election.

CONFLICTING PATTERNS

Most political trends include certain conflicting currents, and the development or intensification of Republicanism in the suburban regions is no exception. Bucks County, Pennsylvania, has for decades consistently turned in decisive Republican majorities. Only in 1936 did the Democratic party ever prevail, and then only to the extent of 50.3 per cent of the major party vote. In the election years 1948 and 1952 Thomas Dewey and President Eisenhower polled 55 per cent and 61 per cent respectively of the major party vote in the county.

June of 1952, however, saw the first family move into the planned community built by Levitt and Sons for the primary purpose of providing the residential requirements for the personnel of the huge Fairless Works of the United States Steel Company. Since then 16,500 families have moved into Levittown and Fairless Hills, which are located in Fall and Bristol Townships and Tullytown Borough. It is incorrect to state that the population of these jurisdictions is composed entirely of families associated with the steel plant. In fact, 28 per cent of the gainfully employed, including professional and business people, work in Philadelphia and 22 per cent in communities outside Bucks County.

So disorganized was the Democratic party in this area that in 1951 it did not file a complete slate of candidates for county offices and won only 2500 votes compared to 14 thousand cast for Republican candidates. By 1953 both parties filed complete slates of candidates, and in November of that year the Republican vote was 27 thousand and the Democratic vote 18 thousand. The gap between the parties was narrowed

further in 1954 when the Republican candidate for governor surpassed Governor George M. Leader in the county by 32,339 to 31,005.

Their campaign in no way handicapped by charges of corruption (later proved in court) brought against the Republican County Chairman, who was also County Coroner, the Democratic Party was able in 1955 to elect 7 out of 10 candidates, including two County Commissioners who, in accordance with Pennsylvania practice, distributed according to patronage principles a good share of county jobs. Although the Democratic victories have not yet met the test of a presidential year, the evidence indicates a fairly competitive two party system in this region.

No entirely satisfactory, much less scientific, explanation can be offered for the converse political trend followed by Bucks County in the past four years. While the Republican Party never enjoyed the majorities in this county that it held in neighboring counties of Montgomery and Delaware, it was consistently successful, especially in local elections. Perhaps the swiftness with which the new population arrived made it difficult for the Republican organization to absorb and channel the newcomers into the prevailing political pattern. On the other hand, a similar town built by Levitt and Sons in Nassau County, Long Island, did not have the same disruptive effect on J. Russell Sprague's Republican organization. In all likelihood a combination of such factors as a young and volatile community, resentment against political intransigency, exposure of corruption, and the feeling of many Levittown-Fairless Hills residents that they were merely moving to another job which happened to be located in a suburban area, caused this paradox in the political development of American suburbs.

Whatever the motives of the suburban voter, the 1952 election showed that he held his views intensely enough for the odds to be 9 to 1 on his voting on election day. In nearly all metropolitan areas for which any type of registration figures could be obtained, a far greater proportion of registered suburbanites voted than did their neighbors in the core city. In 33 counties the median percentage of registered voters who cast a

ballot in 1952 was 89, the range going from 81 per cent in Hamilton County, Ohio, to 95 per cent in St. Louis County, Missouri.⁸

There is some doubt to be entertained regarding the validity of applying past experience in electoral participation to future elections. Certainly, this can never be done in a completely literal manner. Future experience may prove that the 1952 election was unique in many respects. Both candidates, President Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, were new to the national political arena; each had qualities which generated a great deal of popular interest in the election.

Moreover, 1952 was the first year in which full TV coverage was given to the national conventions, and such dramatic events as the close votes on issues and candidates, the acceptance speeches of the successful and the capitulation of the hopefuls, all contributed to a national attitude of political consciousness. "Corruption, Korea, and Communism," the watchword of the successful party, was not unemotional and may have helped to draw voters to the polls.

There is reason to believe that few of these influences will be as strong in 1956 as they were in 1952. Should President Eisenhower and Mr. Stevenson again be the candidates, it is no derogation of either to say that they are not the exciting, undiscovered political personalities of four years ago. When positions on public questions have been taken, when specific policy decisions have been made, when personal idiosyncrasies have been publicized and scrutinized for four years, inevitably some disenchantment occurs.

Now that TV has become more commonplace, the huge audiences drawn to the 1952 conventions may not be duplicated. Current plans of the Republican Party call for a "streamlined" convention in San Francisco at the height of the vacation period, with TV coverage limited to four hours each evening. Whatever the issues of the 1956 campaign, it is unlikely that they will possess

the same controversial nature or the popular impact as the issues of 1952. It is even more doubtful that the 1952 issues could be renovated and successfully used again.

The question today is whether the party in office can re-launch a "crusade" based upon new issues or warmed-over old issues, or whether the party out of office can identify itself with a program as appealing as that of the out party four years ago. If the major political parties cannot re-kindle the interest of the 1952 campaign, the amazingly high level of electoral participation in the suburbs will not be repeated, and the potential impact on the election returns of the still-increasing population of the suburbs will not be felt to an appreciable extent.

It cannot be gainsaid that many suburbanites in the United States seem to take pleasure in cultivating a politically independent state of mind. Some counties normally designated as suburban have population densities as high, if not higher, than sections of the core city. Even so, the pattern of political favor and resultant political obligation characteristic of older urban areas has never been strongly established in suburban communities.

This is not to say that obligations and the presence of a "bread and butter" vote do not exist. There are a number of counties where the skillful use of patronage by the leaders of the majority party has assisted in keeping counties from deviating in their loyalty, despite the presence of factors ordinarily influential in turning voters from one party to another. Yet the use of patronage and prestige appointment is an indirect and unreliable form of political control, for the number of appointees is seldom more than one per cent of the population. Traditional and flagrant types of political favor, such as interceding with law enforcement officers or conferring unofficial health and welfare benefits, have never played an important role in suburban politics and do not today.

If this is true of the more thickly settled regions of the suburbs, it is even more apparent where the population is sparser. Here the independence of the voters is so fierce that the extent of political activity on election day is the distribution of small

⁸ Niagara and Erie Counties in New York submitted returns on registration and total vote in November of 1952 which would indicate that 99 per cent and 100.2 per cent of the voters in the respective counties went to the polls. Whatever the error involved, electoral participation in these counties was undoubtedly high.

sample ballots at the polls, and occasionally bringing an elderly person by automobile to vote. On election day there is no canvassing and no telephoning nor is any extensive work of this kind done before the election. Political workers of both parties in these sections assert that the electorate resents the slightest attempt to encourage a citizen to avail himself of the right to vote, much less induce him to support a particular party. This is true even of communities where the large majority of voters support the more powerful, that is, the Republican Party. The voters' adherence to political independence compels party activity of an oblique nature, quite different from that associated with political organizations.

It can be inferred from this discussion of suburban political behavior that the term "suburb" is frequently no more than a sobriquet. The differences among and within the 57 counties included by the Census Bureau in the category of the 20 largest metropolitan districts are differences in kind as well as degree. For example, Westmoreland and Washington Counties in Pennsylvania are considered as part of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. The median income for Westmoreland families and related individuals is \$2,802, and in Washington it is \$2,797. These median incomes are substantially less than the \$2,834 median for the state of Pennsylvania, and far less than the \$3,411 figure of Montgomery County and the \$3,770 of Delaware County, both of which are in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.

As far as differences within a particular area are concerned, Pennsylvania's Delaware County furnishes a striking example. This 185 square mile area includes oil refineries, Main Line mansions, wretched slums, shipyards, comfortable residential districts, some farms and orchards, automobile assembly plants, and so on. Although many of the residents respond affirmatively when asked whether they consider themselves suburbanites, a goodly number possess little more than an address outside the geographic limits of the city. Six

of the county's 185 square miles now have a population density of over 15 thousand,⁴ 12 have a density between 10 thousand and 15 thousand, 7 square miles have a density of five thousand to ten thousand and 73 square miles a density of one thousand to five thousand. In the northern and western areas of the county 56 square miles have a density from two hundred to a thousand and only 35 square miles a density below two hundred. This impressive range should be considered when political analysts refer to the "suburban vote" in the coming presidential and other elections. It is regrettable that a more precise meaning of the term has not developed, but this is manifestly impossible at this point in our social history.

One has only to note the role of the suburban vote as an element in the political power balance in certain states to recognize its importance, actual and potential. The five states, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, comprise 122 of the 531 votes in the Electoral College. In the presidential election of 1952 the proportion of the Eisenhower majority in these states that was composed of the majorities he amassed in their suburban counties ranged from 33 per cent in New York to 100 per cent in Massachusetts. It is apparent, then, that the immediate political future of a number of states depends upon the ability of the major parties to attract the suburban vote. As a consequence, the national verdict in 1956 may depend upon the intensity of the political convictions of the electorate in those counties which surround the great cities of the United States.

Currently the advantage seems to be with the Republican Party, but there are several contingencies which might arise to create a substantial improvement in the strength of the Democratic Party in the crucial suburban areas. Considering this, both major parties would do well to design certain phases of their campaigns with a view to appealing to this increasingly decisive segment of the American electorate.

⁴ These six square miles contain chiefly the city of Chester.

"It is obvious that no interest group, no other voluntary society, can perform the functions at present performed by the parties in our democracy," comments this author, because "... when the chips are down, it is to the parties that we must all look to leadership."

The Problem of the Independent Voter

BY MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR.

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"**B**UT THE independents will hold the balance of power and decide the election"—so runs a common refrain, familiar as an old hymn. The thesis that independents, not partisans, determine who shall be our political rulers is deeply rooted in American folklore. Pollsters, well-meaning citizens and perhaps even some politicians subscribe to this view. If valid to any great degree, the theory of independency has alarming implications. Let us examine what is and is not known about this controversial subject.

Political scientists in recent years have subjected the independent voter to some systematic analysis. While there is still considerable uncertainty about the psychological and sociological roots of independency, a beginning has been made. Enough is now known about the phenomenon to outline some of the difficulties and problems.

A leading student of political behavior, Prof. Samuel J. Eldersveld of the University of Michigan, has identified five types of independents. In his classification, the independents consist of split-ticket voters, those

who transfer party allegiance after a time, voters with no crystallized party predispositions, those who waver in making a voting decision and minor-party supporters.

In determining, as an initial step, the numbers of independent voters, two criteria have usually been adopted. The first is to examine objective evidence from election statistics, and make some kind of inference. For example, a crude technique would be to determine the numbers of people who shifted from the Democratic to Republican column between 1948 and 1952, and to label the shifters "independents." This method obviously does not help in identifying the characteristics and motivations of the shifters.

A second criterion is that of self-classification, i.e., to ask people whether they consider themselves to be Democrats, Republicans or independents. This is the method used by public opinion experts and it, too, is not by itself satisfactory. As an illustration of the difficulty, consider Professor Eldersveld's study made in Washtenaw County, Michigan, in the spring of 1949. By objective standards, about half of those who claimed to be independent were not. Nonetheless, the sample poll or survey, combined with hard evidence, remains the principal tool for uncovering the independent voter and probing his motivations and preferences.

Using this standard approach in its 1948 national study, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan found that 36.7 per cent of its respondents could objectively be classified as independents of various sorts. At about the same time, the

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Gallup Poll, on the basis of self-classification, arrived at a percentage of 29.0. Whatever the exact figure—and it varies from time to time, regardless of the method used—somewhere between one-fifth and two-fifths of the electorate consider themselves to be “independents.”

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Of course, how people view themselves, and how they actually behave, may be miles apart. This appears to be the case with independency. In a survey conducted in October, 1952, the Survey Research Center found, not unsurprisingly, that most Americans “identify” themselves with one of the major parties. The technique used was this: people classifying themselves as “independents” were asked which party they generally supported. In this fashion, in addition to Republicans and Democrats, two other categories were worked out—“independent Republicans” and “independent Democrats.” On this basis, *only five per cent of the total were independents*, and another four per cent were listed under the heading “none, minor party, or not ascertained.” A later survey, in September, 1953, put the figures at that point on the political continuum at four and seven, respectively.

What the Survey Research Center demonstrated is that party identification is a matter of degree. Some persons are much firmer in their attachment than others. Most “independents” are really loosely affiliated Republicans or Democrats, people whose sense of identification is less intense.

The findings of the Survey Research Center point up the difficulties in measuring independency. If we take what people say at face value, and even observe how they act, a substantial minority of Americans are independents. If we delve more deeply into the political behavior of these people in an effort to learn preferences and tendencies and consistencies, we end up with a less impressive total. Using a restrictive definition, we find that the hard core of independents (including minor party supporters) must be placed at around, say, ten per cent of the electorate. Because of these divergencies in definition, statements on the char-

acteristics of independents must be handled with caution.

Some general information is available from the 1948 Michigan study. Professor Eldersveld, in summing up the findings, points out that in 1948, more women than men split their ballots, that older voters were more prone than the younger to vote a straight ticket, that the least educated were more apt to vote consistently partisan. If one's income fell in the category above \$3,000 yearly, he was more likely to vote independently.

A study of the electorate of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, during the campaign of 1952, unearthed some interesting data. Professor Philip K. Hastings found that 40 per cent of the adult population claimed to be independent, that in terms of social characteristics this group tended to be more like the Democrats than the Republicans, with one exception. The exception was that both the independents and the Republicans outshone the Democrats in their knowledge of campaign issues and public affairs.

Another approach to the problem of identifying the independents has been provided by Gallup Polls. A survey made in 1948 asked people, divided into broad occupational groupings, whether they thought of themselves as independents. It turned out that 34 per cent of the business and professional group thought so; so did 34 per cent of white collar persons, 27 per cent of the manual workers and 17 per cent of the farmers.

Very little is known about why people are independents in politics. One presumption is that independency carries with it a mark of prestige. For example, a man who says, “I vote for the best man, not a party,” clearly feels a degree of moral superiority over the straight-ticket partisan. In addition to reasons related to prestige and smugness, it is probable that some of the hard core of independents vote as they do because of deep underlying dissatisfaction with the existing order of things. A supporter of a Marxist minor party would probably fall into this category.

If it be assumed, in accordance with the Gallup findings already noted, that the independents are not concentrated in one

group, class or region, but are widely distributed, certain strategic consequences follow. For example, any effective appeal to the independents would have to be very broad indeed, since this group is presumed to include elements of most of the significant segments of the electorate.

This line of reasoning, widely accepted, has been challenged by Professor Eldersveld. In his Michigan study he tested the attitude of independents on one current political issue of great importance—price control. He learned that the majority of independents adopted extreme positions, as did the partisans, even though the independents were “somewhat more ambivalent.” This would suggest—it does no more—that to obtain the independent “vote” or “votes” may require more specific appeals and stands on issues than has been generally supposed.

TICKET-SPLITTERS

One common form of independency is ticket-splitting. In 1952, the Survey Research Center reported that 34 per cent of the persons sampled had voted for candidates of different parties—probably a higher than usual percentage. Especially in years of presidential elections, it is a fairly common practice for some millions of persons to support presidential and gubernatorial nominees of different parties. In recent years, for example, many Ohio Republicans supported both the Republican presidential candidate and Democratic Governor Lausche.

It is an interesting parlor game to speculate on why this sort of situation can develop. In his recent book, *American State Politics*, Harvard political scientist V. O. Key, Jr., offers some suggestive comments. After pointing out that party consistency is the rule, and ticket-splitting the exception, Professor Key observes that a common partisanship usually envelops both the national and the state party apparatus. Granting this is the normal situation, one wonders why defection so often occurs on a large scale.

One explanation suggested by Professor Key is the ability of firmly entrenched state parties to muster strength behind a state

ticket in such a degree as to offset “the opposition presidential tide.” By separating state from national issues, a state party may retain its local power while losing the presidential contest to its rival. In addition, Professor Key notes that some gubernatorial candidates show a marked reluctance to work hard for a presidential nominee of their own party when that nominee is almost sure *not* to carry the state. In short, why be associated with a loser and have him as a drag on the ticket?

In addition to ticket-splitting, another form of independency is to support “third parties,” whether of a purely state variety, as the Liberal party of New York, or of a national type, as the Socialist Workers party. While the Liberal party in New York appears likely to survive, the history of third parties, especially of the labor and farmer type, has been marked by failure and frustration. The perpetual dream of third parties—to hold the balance of power—has, outside New York State, rarely been achieved during this century.

But is there not some room for the bold and brave independent who, operating at the Olympian levels of a John Stuart Mill, examines the candidates rationally, and votes regardless of party? No doubt such people exist, but they are hard to find in any great numbers. Until the publication of Samuel Lubell’s *Revolt of the Moderates*, many persons imagined that hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers fitted into the idealized picture. Now Mr. Lubell has come along and rudely shattered these illusions.

In 1950, Vincent Impellitteri ran for mayor of New York City on an independent ticket and won. A year later Rudolph Halley ran for president of the city council on an independent ticket and won. Besides some jubilation over the supposed overthrow of various “bosses,” it was widely fancied that the identical independents had elected both men.

To test this thesis, Mr. Lubell examined the voting in both elections in the various Brooklyn Assembly districts. He found that, generally, where one man had been the strongest, the other had been the weakest. Further investigation disclosed the fact that

not one, but two "streams of insurgency" were in operation. According to Mr. Lubell, one came from "Catholic voting elements" and the other "mainly from Jewish areas." His conclusion is that even when they become "independents," the voters by and large do so "within the pattern of their cultural conditioning." For Mr. Lubell, the "independent" above partisan emotions does not exist.

So much for a survey of the literature on independency. It may now be asked whether, since scientific studies have revealed the practical and theoretical limitations of their position, those Americans who have hitherto prided themselves on independence are now likely to vote on a more partisan basis. Are those rugged individuals who register as "independent," and thus exclude themselves from the key point in partisanship—the nomination of party candidates—going to mend their ways?

Probably not, or at least, not immediately. An oft quoted statement of Professor E. E. Schattschneider of Wesleyan University helps to explain the reason:

In the folklore of politics the greatest virtue of public officials is 'independence.' Thus, independent candidates are better than party candidates. Thus, also, a member of Congress who refuses to work with the members of his party is more moral than a member who does work with his party. Independence *per se* is a virtue, and party loyalty *per se* is an evil.¹

In an earlier and very influential book, *Party Government*, Professor Schattschneider has brilliantly dissected the nature of American politics. Its most notable characteristic he finds to be the very great degree of de-

centralization, i.e., the diffusion of power. According to his analysis, this decentralization weakens the national parties, puts a premium on insurgency, and strengthens the hands of interest groups. From all this stems an understandable boredom of and frustration with politics on the part of millions of Americans. Professor Schattschneider's solution is to create stronger national parties, but he recognizes that this will come about only when and if the American people so desire, probably as the result of changed social, ideological and economic conditions.

Why does Professor Schattschneider feel that independency is not a virtue but an evil? Primarily because he believes that independency makes it difficult to create responsible national parties, parties which (under a two-party system) can mobilize majorities and then govern. Furthermore, it is his view that much of the energy currently devoted to do-good interest groups, independent candidates, minor parties and movements in general could be more effectively utilized if it were channeled through the major parties. Not the least of the benefits that might be derived is the infusion of new blood and brains into party leadership. For when the chips are down, it is to the parties that we must all look for leadership.

It is obvious that no interest group, no other voluntary society, can perform the functions at present performed by the parties in our democracy. The man who is not by nature a hermit can hardly rationally prefer atomistic individualism to group cooperation, whether in church, union, fraternal or political matters. In another context, John Donne once observed that no man is an island. The poet's observation is equally relevant for the citizen in his capacity as a voter.

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 1948), p. 6.



"Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are again upon you."

—Abraham Lincoln, *First Inaugural Address*, March 4, 1861.

"To say, as former President Truman so frequently does, that one political party is the party of 'the interests,' and the other, the party of 'the people' is patently ridiculous. Both parties are involved with 'interests' of all sorts and often with the same interests."

Lobbying

BY ROFFE WIKE

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"You just put good, green folding money in their lily-white hands and be . . . sure they know why you put it there."

THIS statement, reportedly made by a regional counsel for an oil company, aptly if somewhat crudely presents the problem of lobbying today. Lobbying has been defined in many ways and has existed in some form or another as long as governments have functioned. Generally, lobbying is regarded as the attempt on the part of some interested group to influence legislation by some direct or otherwise appropriate means.

Lobbying activities have taken many forms and have ranged from the crude to the subtle. For years most academic political literature has deplored the existence of the so called "pressure group" that engages in lobbying. Ironically, while scholarly observers and various types of political reformers scolded and shuddered, lobbying flourished at the national and state levels in a most flagrant and primitive manner.

Roffe Wike graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He wrote his doctoral thesis on the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association, one of the largest and most politically powerful groups of its kind in the United States. He has recently been appointed Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.

Joseph R. Grundy of Pennsylvania, manufacturer, politician and a great tariff lobbyist, told the Senate Committee investigating lobbying in 1929 how he justified his activities in connection with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. The tariff plank (which he had been instrumental in inserting) of the Republican platform called for high protective tariffs. Mr. Grundy had raised money for the party partly on the basis of this platform and he had come to Washington to see to it that it was enacted.

In its final report, the Senate Committee concluded: that

it was believed by him (Grundy)—that by reason of the very substantial aid he had rendered as revenue raiser for political campaigns, he would be able to influence the action of his party associates in Congress.

This type of cash-and-carry lobbying was traditional and typical of tariff lobbying. It was probably carried over from lobbying in the State legislature.

While various interest groups had their lobbyists testify before committees regarding proposed legislation, the most effective technique was personal contact. Frequently, such personal contact resulted not only in a campaign contribution but in an outright bribe. There was, however, another aspect to personal contact lobbying that was well known to the aforementioned Joseph R. Grundy, founder of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association. In 1912, he told an annual meeting of the P.M.A.:

It is through their constituents, voters who live in their own representative district, that the Legislature members can best be reached, for the opinion of a voter, whose political support is

desired, will be considered and the argument of such a person will most likely receive due weight.

Mr. Grundy knew that such opinion would be given great weight if that constituent were a prominent leader in the community able to sway opinion as well as to contribute funds to a political campaign.

During the middle 1920's, techniques began to change and become more sophisticated and respectable, especially in Congress. Lobbyists testified before committees, and presented detailed information and intelligent and persuasive arguments that appealed to the legislator's judgment. Expert advice and information and even suggested legislation were provided when necessary to the lawmakers. Letter-writing campaigns were continued but became less effective because they were often too obviously contrived. Entertainment and gifts became more subtle. One method remained, however, that harked back to the old cash-and-carry tradition. This was the method described by the oil lawyer above: the direct personal campaign contribution.

LOBBYING AND POLITICAL PARTIES

It has long been obvious, even to the most casual observer of politics, that a political party has two important requirements for successful survival: votes and money. Interest groups that represented one or both of these elements could always gain access to a political party, but this access was always on a fairly general basis. To impress national or state party leaders, the interest group would naturally have to represent a sizable number of votes or a substantial amount of money.

Consequently, labor unions have found access to political parties relatively easy not only because they represented votes, but because they could contribute generally to campaign funds. Business organizations, on the other hand, could offer more in terms of financial aid than votes. The Hatch Acts, and now the Criminal Code, prohibit actual financial contributions to political parties or candidates from corporations and unions.

Partly because of this and partly because of lack of effectiveness, the monetary cam-

paign contribution has been directed away from the political party toward the legislator himself. The relative lack of discipline and national leadership in American political parties has greatly facilitated this process of side-stepping the party, so to speak, to reach the legislator directly.

This very effective lobbying device flourishes at the state level. The campaign contribution, either directly to the prospective lawmaker or to his party, has probably been the major means for various interest groups in states to gain access to political parties and to the state governments. The purpose of this access, of course, was always to influence legislation.

The result of this sort of lobbying has been that many state party organizations have come to be dominated or at least strongly influenced by powerful state interest groups usually representing a definite economic interest. The relationship of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association to the Republican Party of Pennsylvania and the relationship of the C.I.O.-A.F. of L. to the Democratic Party of Michigan exemplify this sort of situation. In many mid-western states, especially Wisconsin and Minnesota, farm groups play a dominant role in local political organizations.

There are several important reasons why lobbying has been so successful at the state level, and the campaign contribution has only been one of them. Political parties in the states are often coalitions of local county organizations. Strong centralized leadership and discipline is lacking and intraparty conflicts based purely on personality differences and loyalties are frequent. This makes access for the lobbyist to an individual county party leader much easier.

Another important reason is that in some states there are important economic interests that affect the welfare of the whole state. Manufacturing, coal mining and rail transport have always been the dominant economic interests in Pennsylvania. Agriculture has dominated in many mid-western states. With the growth of labor organizations, it is only natural that they would desire political access, and generally they have turned to that party in a state that was not allied with the dominant industrial interests.

The existence of this situation is not unknown to the voting public in the states; the press discusses it openly and state political leaders make little effort to hide from it. Governor Mennen Williams of Michigan openly associates with state labor leaders and addresses their conventions, and, in Pennsylvania, most of the state legislators and officials (especially Republican) can be seen at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association. There is thus an apparent acceptance of this situation at the state level probably because the voter believes that the success of these groups in some way affects his own welfare. Professor Robert Dengler, in his excellent studies of lobbying by oil companies and their trade association, the American Petroleum Institute, recently published in the *New Republic*, noted that oil companies were most aware of this situation and exploited it in their new lobbying technique: public relations campaigns in various states.

There has been relatively little effort made to control lobbying in the states. The best means of regulation has been the ballot. Voting certain local political leaders out of power and upsetting long-entrenched parties in the state capital have always been excellent means of controlling the effects of lobbying. Even after political defeat, the activities of the various organized interest groups and their lobbies always continue, but their task is made more difficult. In recent years, however, organized interest groups, in order to counter voter reaction, have increasingly turned to the public relations campaign, perhaps guided by Lincoln's classic observation:

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.

In his studies of lobbying by oil companies Professor Dengler emphasized with amazement and dismay the smooth effectiveness of the new technique. At its simplest level, public relations involves being nice

to the right people. Professor Dengler quoted a lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute who told him he would help a new Colorado legislator when he came to Denver: "I'll help him around, find out what committee he wants, explain about them, and help him get set on the committee if I possibly can."

At its more sophisticated level, public relations involves a brilliantly calculated program of creating a favorable climate of public opinion for a certain idea or a certain group. These public relations techniques are quasi-scientific, cleverly intuitive and, of course, expensive, and they have helped "sell" the oil industry not only to the people of many states, but virtually to the nation and Congress as well.

The more conventional means of lobbying are of course still practiced at both the national and state levels. All interested groups continue to testify before congressional and state legislative committees. Letters are still written and expert information is always happily supplied. Entertaining and gifts have not been abandoned. But these more respectable forms of lobbying seem to be only window-dressing. The real work now appears to be along the lines of the revived (or re-emphasized since it was probably never dropped) personal campaign contribution and the new subtle art of persuasion called public relations.

PROBLEM OF CONTROL

Political scientists, politicians and probably most of the American public today accept lobbies and the "pressure" groups behind them as part of the governmental process. In its final report, the Select Committee of the Senate that investigated the \$2,500 campaign contribution to Senator Francis Case, Republican of South Dakota, and its relation to the recent vote on the Natural Gas Bill, regarded lobbying as an outgrowth of the right to petition, guaranteed by the First Amendment.

The committee concluded that lobbying, "in its proper use," was "a necessary and beneficial adjunct to the orderly process of government." Lobbying itself is no longer a cause for shock or concern. The control

of lobbying—keeping it to its proper use—is a major problem facing government, state and national, and political parties today.

The 1946 Federal Lobbying Act sought to solve this problem by requiring all lobbyists to register and report the source of their incomes and their expenses. The assumption behind the legislation was that publicity was the best means of control. In upholding the constitutionality of most of the Act in 1954, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Supreme Court, further elaborated on the purpose of the Act.

Present day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress can not be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends, to no small extent, on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may be all too easily drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal.

The Court interpreted the Lobbying Act further to apply it only to persons who have received contributions for the specific purpose of influencing legislation; these persons or lobbyists must be in *direct* contact with members of Congress. Obviously, this interpretation of the Lobbying Act is not adequate to cope with the lobbyists' most effective methods: the individual campaign contributions and the public relations campaign. Such professional and trade associations as the American Medical Association, the American Petroleum Institute and the Chamber of Commerce, all able conductors of public relations campaigns, question whether the Lobbying Act applies to them.

If the legislator is to evaluate properly the pressures on him (as the Chief Justice noted), he must not only be able to recognize the groups that contribute to his campaigns, but to know why they contribute. The Senate Select Committee realistically did not rule out campaign contributions. They felt that contributions are entirely within the bounds of propriety when the purpose for which they are given is the election of the member and not for the purpose of influencing his vote.

Admittedly, there is a seeming naiveté in this statement since no group or person contributes to the expense of electing a legislator without considering how he has voted on certain issues or how he will vote in the future. Some interest groups and their lobbyists are outspokenly candid on this matter. A labor lobbyist for the A.F. of L. wrote in his union's magazine, *The American Federationist*, of the factors to be considered before he supports a legislator.

Experience over the years has shown us that to include other than prime labor issues is to include practically the entire voting record of that member. This may or may not be the answer, but we have found that a strict labor voting record can and does meet our requirements as we have regarded them for a long time. In this way we have found it practical to maintain our activities on an economic foundation rather than ideological.

Obviously, Mr. Howard B. Keck, President of the Superior Oil Company of California, who established a personal campaign fund to be used to elect Congressmen, and who was interested in the passage of the ill-fated natural gas de-control bill, did not maintain his activities along ideological lines either. It was from Mr. Keck's personal fund that Mr. John Neff obtained the famous \$2,500 that was offered to Senator Case of South Dakota because of his doubtful position on the gas bill.

Mindful of this desire by the lobbies for specific performance on the part of lawmakers, the Senate Select Committee investigating the Case affair recommended that each candidate be required by law to have a fiscal agent to solicit, accept and make public all campaign contributions. In this way all direct contact would be eliminated. This would, however, offset the Court's requirement that registration be required only of those groups that have *direct* contact with congressmen. They also would require that any group or person making a contribution in excess of \$5,000 in one year be required to file a detailed account thereof with the to believe apparently that further publicity Secretary of the Senate. Congress continues is the only means of control.

The problem of lobbies and political interest or "pressure" groups transcends party lines. The recent vote on the natural gas bill exemplified this. No less a person than the liberal Democratic Senator Fulbright of Arkansas was found voting on the same side as the conservative Republican Senator Edward Martin of Pennsylvania. The web of personal relationships leading up to the campaign gift to Senator Case demonstrates the essential *non-party* character of lobbying.

Professor Dengler, in his study on oil lobbying, found that the oil interests and their lobbies prefer to work both sides of the political spectrum. To say, as former President Truman so frequently does, that one political party is the party of "the interests," and the other, the party of "the people" is patently ridiculous. Both parties are involved with "interests" of all sorts and often with the same interests.

The fact that public relations techniques are now at the disposal of these groups makes the problem even greater. Congress may require the lobbyist to publicize his activities and they may try to protect the individual lawmaker from "improper" campaign gifts, but this does not curtail the effect of public relations' campaigns. Nor, for that matter, is publicity alone going to prevent a legislator from voting along the lines so desired by those groups who contribute most heavily toward his campaign.

Is a congressman who accepts large contributions from a political committee of the C.I.O.-A.F. of L. going to vote against a

measure supported by the union just because publicity has been given to their financial support? Is a senator whose known main financial support comes from a powerful state manufacturers' association likely to vote against their wishes just because that support is publicized? Most congressmen know the source of their campaign funds, and what groups contribute the large amounts, and they can easily surmise why they do so. Consequently, further publicity requirements by the government today will have only limited value in dealing with the lobbying problem created by the campaign contribution and public relations campaigns.

The answer to this problem lies with our individual candidates and with our political parties. Edmund Burke, the British statesman of the Eighteenth Century, in a letter to his constituents, told them that a representative should always be mindful of his constituents' interests, and attentive to their opinions but "his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living."

Until the leaders of our political parties and our political candidates decide to exercise their *independent* judgment more than they do now, the problem of lobbies and their influence can not adequately be solved. Perhaps, because of the unpleasant publicity given lobbying in connection with the natural gas bill investigation in the Senate, and the veto message of President Eisenhower, the coming elections may show a change.



"'Tis substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric? Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."

—George Washington, Farewell Address, September 1796.

Books and Ballots

BY DAVID DENKER

Assistant Provost, Rutgers University

THIS essay is designed to give the reader varying glimpses of the best of the year's books on politics. Here are vital books—and equally vital questions—that must claim the attention of every citizen of the republic. What is the story of our society as the nation girds for the national political conventions? Who are the PR men who go about molding public opinion and selling their political product by the same basic techniques which sell soap and cars? What is the future of the presidency? Who are the men around President Eisenhower and what part have they played during the past four years in national and world affairs?

Here are examples of the authors' quick

eye for a story, the amazing facility to get at all the facets, the clear way of telling it. The books serve to point up the major issues as well as to illustrate existing tensions in America's quadrennial spree of 1956. All sides of the literature are here: the scholarly, the sober, the infuriating jargon of the sociologist, the mastery of the loaded adjective, the skillful insinuation, the distorted inference, the responsible hatchet job and the special pleader.

An appraisal of all the books on politics would be an arduous task. They are too many for an essay of this limited scope. This must be my excuse for omitting some authors and confining my attention to others. Here is how I stuff my ballot box: *The Power Elite*, by C. Wright Mills, a sociologist, who has taken ideas already in the cultural air and given them specific formulation and clarification; *Professional Public Relations and Political Power*, by Stanley Kelley, Jr., who has pointed out that the man who knows how to sway public opinion through the giant media of press, radio and television often becomes not a mere tool of the politician, but a policy-maker high in the councils of the party which employs him; *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years*, by Richard Rovere; *Eisenhower the President*, by Merlo J. Pusey, and *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, by Robert J. Donovan, who report and comment on the Eisenhower years from 1952 and carry right down to the present.

And that, come to think of it, is all the ballot box will contain. It's a pity because I am persuaded to cast a vote or two for *The Truman Administration*, edited by Louis Koenig, and *What I Think*, by Adlai E. Stevenson, who put on the record views about the great issues of the hour, ranging from integrity in campaign to the Formosa crisis, from public power to loyalty and security.

THE POWER ELITE. BY C. WRIGHT MILLS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 412 pp., \$6.00.

PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND POLITICAL POWER. BY STANLEY KELLEY, JR. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. 247 pp., \$4.50.

AFFAIRS OF STATE: THE EISENHOWER YEARS. BY RICHARD ROVERE. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956. 390 pp., \$4.50.

EISENHOWER, THE PRESIDENT. BY MERLO J. PUSEY. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 300 pp., \$3.75.

WHAT I THINK. BY ADLAI E. STEVENSON. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. 240 pp., \$3.00.

EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY. BY ROBERT J. DONOVAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. 423 pp., \$4.95.

THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION. Edited by Louis Koenig, New York: New York University Press. \$5.50.

In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills has advanced a number of provocative arguments with a vividness that American readers have not had since Veblen. The book will stand, I believe, as one of the great books of the mid-century. In *The Power Elite*, Mills depicts the style of life of the men and women at the pinnacles of fame and power and fortune in mid-twentieth century America. Celebrities and the Big Rich, Admirals and Generals, Politicians and Corporation Executives are examined—as well as the nature of the mass society of which these higher circles now constitute the élite. It is the author's thesis that these groups form a center of power in our society that is tightly knit and basically irresponsible.

The essential characteristic of these groups is a tightly knit directorship whose members share a common outlook, a common set of tastes and standards; Mills argues that the manner of life in these groups is generally that of the urban aristocracy everywhere, which is to say comfortable by all cultural standards. Their religious affiliation is likely to be with the Protestant Episcopal Church, or with one of the churches of early colonial origin.

The upper class young are carefully trained in such practices and attitudes as prepare them for eventual upper class membership. At about the time of the onset of puberty they are dispatched to private, one-sex academies, which are often enough church schools located throughout New England, where they are further shaped and trimmed for élite living. From the preparatory schools they go on to the socially approved colleges or universities, such as Yale, Princeton and Harvard.

Are they representative men? In the concluding paragraph of the book, Mills rebukes in the sharpest possible manner "the war lords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate":

The men of the higher circles are not representative men; their high position is not a result of moral virtue; their fabulous success is not firmly connected with meritorious ability. Those who sit in the seats of the high and the mighty are selected and formed by the means of power, the sources of wealth, the mechanics of celebrity

which prevail in their society. They are not men selected and formed by a civil service that is linked with the world of knowledge and sensibility. They are not men shaped by nationally responsible parties that debate openly and clearly the issues this nation now so unintelligently confronts. They are not men held in responsible check by a plurality of voluntary associations which connect debating publics with the pinnacles of decision. Commanders of power unequaled in human history, they have succeeded within the American system of organized irresponsibility.

Among other things, Mills argues that the power élite, in contrast to earlier ruling groups, has no wish to be known as such; it relies on the opinion-makers of press agency to translate power into a lilting liberalism. Mills' ideas taken together make a remarkably interesting story which acquires as we finish the last chapter more significance than we may have felt when he began with the first. For we discover that the author has toiled to eradicate the culture-lag in our thinking, and to secure a vital up-to-date philosophy of society and politics. It is perhaps a misfortune that he could not make up his mind whether to be sociologist, political scientist, historian, chronicler or critic. The result is that he is sometimes one, sometimes the other. This dilemma may explain occasional inconsistencies in the work.

By a convenient coincidence Stanley Kelley's *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* is concerned with the growing role of the opinion-maker who, Mills holds, is alongside or just below the élite. How account for the development of public relations as a handmaiden of politics? Although rigid partitions are misleading, Kelley distinguishes four phases: first, the period before 1900, marked by the businessman's attitude of aloofness toward the press; second, the reaction in 1902 of the Standard Oil Company to muckraking assaults: "We've changed our policy. We're giving out information"; third, the emergence of political public relations in 1929 when the Democrats retained Charlie Michaelson to develop a campaign against the Hoover administration and, later, to beat the drums for the Democrats; fourth, the picture today,

marked by the notable broadening of the scope of public relations in business and politics.

What is Kelley saying? He is asserting that in contemporary America every time you see or hear a candidate, the chances are that his appearance in person or print is part of a scientific campaign plan engineered by an entirely new kind of "politician"—the public relations expert. Replacing the old-style boss as the wielder of political power, his services are available to any party with sufficient funds. Do election returns follow the Men in the Grey Flannel Suits? The outcomes of some campaigns make sense as Kelley considers the American Medical Association's campaign against "socialized medicine," the 1950 Tydings-Butler senatorial campaign, and the Eisenhower-Stevenson presidential race. This is by far the best book to read on how this radical change in our political life came about and what it means to our political future.

And what about our current administration? What of Eisenhower the man and his aides? Three remarkable books have made their appearance—*Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years*, by Richard Rovere; *Eisenhower the President*, by Merlo Pusey; and *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, by Robert J. Donovan. Rovere, who writes for the *New Yorker*, is a master of a style of prose that is refreshingly different from the passionless outpourings of the Washington press corps. The copy in *Affairs of State*, sharp and fresh, unquestionably registers a number of telling points as it ranges over a variety of topics—the Cohn mutiny and McCarthy and Schine, debates over Korea, the revolution in strategic concepts brought about by the new knowledge of thermonuclear weapons, the "amendment fever" that swept the Congress, the crisis in Indo-China and Formosa and the whole disturbing story of the conflict between liberty and authority.

A sizable part of Rovere's book is drawn from his pieces published in the *New Yorker*, but the magazine assignments have not limited the subject matter. Whatever truth there may be in the notion that the pace is as leisurely as the *New Yorker* itself—I myself suspect that the over-all reporting is superb. When he is dealing with

ideas, Rovere is one of the most thoughtful and sensitive critics writing today. The writing is sharp and fresh and marked by the ability to record tense and emotional situations that illuminate the darkneses of the Potomac landscape.

Though the author occasionally despairs of the Eisenhower years and looks back to the fresh fields of the New and Fair Deals, he concludes that Eisenhower's administration must be judged on the whole as a success. President Eisenhower, Rovere estimates, has put before the people of the world "an image of the United States as being a nation of free men and institutions engaged in an experiment of some splendor and one that derives its justification from the hope that it will be useful to all humanity."

His view of Nixon reminds the reader of Professor Mills' criticism of the public relations men around the power élite. "Nixon appears to be a politician with an advertising man's approach to his work," he speculates. "Politics are products to be sold the public—this one today, that one tomorrow, depending on the discounts and the state of the market. He moves from intervention in Indo-China to anti-intervention with the same ease and lack of anguish with which a copy writer might transfer his loyalties from Camels to Chesterfields." There is merit in Rovere's treatment of recent history.

Less serious, and less worthy of commendation, is Merlo Pusey's *Eisenhower the President*. Pusey, a Pulitzer Prize winner for his biography of Charles Evans Hughes, is an unabashed apologist for the Administration. I think that he is unkind and unjust to the serious efforts the Opposition—at any rate the Democrats—has made to improve or reform the Administration. Especial homage and deference are paid to the members of the family group (Brownell, Dulles et al) who emerge chaste against a murky background of dubious Democrats. When he is dealing with the President's staff system of operations, Mr. Pusey is generally informative. But the over-all viewpoint which animates his book is rooted in the notion: "Nothing succeeds like success—and

It has remained for *Eisenhower: The In-*
the Republicans have been successful."

side Story, by Robert J. Donovan, to stir up a furor by the way the White House co-operated in giving the author exclusive access to minutes of Cabinet and similar behind the scenes sessions. As I write this piece, a growing number of dissenters—scholars, editors, politicians and patriots—are dealing swiftly with the Administration. Such fury burst that in front-page stories, surmounted by display headlines, the President was accused of engineering a piece of political propaganda, of improperly giving Donovan access to many hitherto unpublished documents and of weakening the authority of the executive to guard its own secrets. Most reviewers treated the author with enormous respect, admitted his genius, but debated the wisdom of the Eisenhower administration in giving one reporter a monopoly of data about its workings.

The attacks do not take into account, it seems to me, that every President has given information to friendly reporters. Few commentators have noted, for example, that President Truman gave William Hillman and John Hersey access to private papers. And Franklin Delano Roosevelt permitted Arthur Krock to examine the files of all United States Ambassadors' reports to the State Department in the period before the German attack on Poland in 1939. I can't see how President Eisenhower has scandalized the orthodox! The only disturbing thing, as James Reston has said, is that the

Administration is fond of striking high moral poses and insisting that it is above political tricks.

It seems unnecessary for me to add, after the foregoing, that Donovan affords the reader some intimate glimpses into the Administration's activities. Here are some examples:

1. The President's decision to run for a second term came 111 days after his heart attack.

2. Senator McCarthy's activities caused the President to roar like a lion. The Senator "disgusted and infuriated" the President and would "cause him to go up in an utter blaze." But as for giving McCarthy "both barrels" the President told his aides in late 1953: "I will not get in the gutter with that guy."

3. In January, 1954, the President said this about the Bricker Amendment: "he had heard that the Constitution was being demolished brick by brick by Bricker."

It seems to me that Donovan's work towers above the other books on Eisenhower. He has traced the whole circle of executive action from the Eisenhower beginnings to the eve of the 1956 contest. He has now produced facts which tear away the veil of myth. After thorough ransacking of the materials, he has offered new explanations for the Administration's conduct at home and abroad. Critics cannot neglect or ignore this factor.

(To be concluded next month)



"The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual, and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

"Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it."

George Washington in his Farewell Address, 1796.

Received At Our Desk

American History

THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS.

BY ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 230 pages, appendix and index, \$5.00).

Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, this slender volume traces the story of the Bill of Rights: its English beginnings; its history in the colonies; the Bill of Rights in the Constitutional Convention; the struggle for ratification. A brief chapter sums up the history of the Bill of Rights since 1791. "The rise of corporations, the income tax and geographical considerations, to mention a few items, have caused many phrases in the original Constitution to be turned 'inside out,'" as the author observes. "But the dignity of the human personality remains the same, whether the right involved be that of blocking the door to a redcoat soldier or holding a private telephone conversation." The author also notes the current "complete rejection of the eighteenth century notion that government was at best a necessary evil which must be curbed to safeguard individual freedom." As he sums up his study: "At the middle of the twentieth century it was clear, as it had been in 1791, that the surest sanctuary of freedom for the citizen still was not in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, but in the minds of the people."

FRONTIER POLITICS AND THE SECTIONAL CONFLICT.

BY ROBERT W. JOHANSEN. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956. 219 pages, bibliography, illustrations and index, \$5.00).

This study of "The Pacific Northwest on the Eve of the Civil War" focuses on the relationships between frontier political life and national politics. Chapters deal with: the land and the people; settlers and slavery; seeds of political discord; the realignment of parties; the campaign of

1860; compromise or civil war; the union, conservatism and peace. This is a detailed, scholarly and well documented study.

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE HUMANITARIAN REFORMERS.

BY RUSSEL B. NYE. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1956. 206 pages, notes and index, \$3.00).

A volume in "The Library of American Biography" edited by Oscar Handlin of Harvard University, this life of William Lloyd Garrison recaptures something of the spirit of the pre-Civil War reformers in America. As the author notes in the epilogue: "Garrison was a true revolutionary individualist who accepted nothing beyond himself, no tradition or institution whose existence violated his own inner, higher law." He preached abolition, "personified its aggressive phase, publicized it for better or worse and drove the issues deep into the national conscience." Yet his refusal to compromise or to cooperate with others meant that abolition, "set in motion by others, was carried to its conclusion by methods he could not accept and ideas he could not understand."

JAMES WILSON. FOUNDING FATHER.

1742-1798. BY CHARLES PAGE SMITH. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. 395 pages, notes and index, \$7.50).

Another volume published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, this biography details the life of an almost forgotten framer of the American Constitution. His life and his contribution to American law and politics cover the period of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress, the Constitutional Convention. Later, as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, James Wilson also played a part in interpreting the Constitution he had helped

to shape. The author, Assistant Professor of History in the University of California at Los Angeles, weaves his own interpretation of history into the story, enriching the account and stimulating the reader, as he describes the influence of the legal revolution on the American Revolution. As he sees it, "The American Revolution was not only the end of a legal revolution, it was a revolution of the lawyers." He believes that "the discomfort of modern historians dealing with the significance of the American Revolution is due to the three strands—legal, political and social—that are woven through the events of the years from 1776-1789." He writes: "Wilson is thus a key figure because he represents the reception into America of a tradition, essentially medieval and scholastic, that has important implications in our history."

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP. BY DEXTER PERKINS. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1956. 190 pages, notes and index, \$3.50).

This volume in "The Library of American Biography," edited by Oscar Handlin, details the life of one of America's greatest lawyer-statesmen. Lawyer, Governor of New York State, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, opponent of the League of Nations, Secretary of State under Warren G. Harding, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes was a distinguished Twentieth Century American. As Dexter Perkins points out: "Hughes believed that tolerance was the hallmark of a democratic society. . . . As Chief Justice he was almost invariably on the side of freedom." Summing up Hughes' attitude toward civil liberty, the author notes that "The decisions in which he participated came at a time when the specter of totalitarianism in Europe loomed larger than ever but before the public mind had become infected with the fear that the institutions of this country were threatened with a terrible danger of internal subversion. He set up a standard in these decisions to which later generations might well repair."

THE POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by AUGUST HECKSER. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 385 pages and acknowledgments, \$5.00).

The President of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and Director of the Twentieth Century Fund has collected materials from Wilson's books, magazine articles and speeches. The selections are arranged to follow the chronology of Wilson's career, to portray the man and to interest Americans in "a deeper study of the example of Woodrow Wilson."

THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGIA. BY CULLEN B. GOSNELL AND C. DAVID ANDERSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1956. 373 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$4.95).

Edited by W. Brooke Graves as part of the American Commonwealths Series, this detailed analysis of the government of Georgia is part of an "effort to provide parallel studies of the governments of each of the forty-eight states and the four major territories." Chapters on Georgia's resources and peoples, its constitutional development, its government structure, its financial administration and its courts precede chapters on Georgian education, health and welfare. State and local governments and intergovernmental relations are some of the other topics carefully studied here. Information on Negro schools and some careful comment on the problem of desegregation is included.

THE DESOLATE SOUTH. 1865-1866. BY JOHN T. TROWBRIDGE. Edited by Gordon Carroll. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956. 320 pages and illustrations, \$6.00).

Here is a contemporary account of "The Desolate South" after the Civil War, told by a Northern writer who traveled for four months through eight states of the defeated Confederacy. Summing up his travels, this keen visitor noted: "of *unarmed* rebellion, of continued sectional strife, stirred up by Southern politicians, there exists very great danger." His word pictures of a devastated land are vivid.

AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

BY CARLOS B. EMBRY. (New York: David McKay, 1956. 229 pages and index, \$3.50).

"The Facts about our Indian Reservations Today" should be more widely known, whether or not the designation "concentration camp" is a justifiable description of a situation that is hardly the result of systematic planning. The author, formerly a Kentucky teacher and principal and publisher of a newspaper chain, traces the history of our treatment of the Indian: his legal position in the United States; his dependence on grazing lands and "what happened to the sheep"; his very restricted right to suffrage; his social status and the condition of his health. The study is divided into three parts: the Statement of the Case; the Evidence of the Witnesses; and Pleading the Case. "The Indian is the worst fed, the worst clad, and the worst housed of any racial group in the United States. It follows that he has the highest illiteracy rate." The author compares the contemporary status of the Negro, who raised himself by his own bootstraps, with that of the Indian wards of the government. Provision for adequate schooling for Indian children and adults would speed Indian progress. "A congressional committee should be set up immediately and directed to work out the details of legislation that would effect the closing of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in an orderly and conscientious manner, transferring the Indian's property to him, removing the discriminatory laws against him and giving him full participation in the operation of his county, state and Federal government. . . ."

* * *

Economic Policy

MONOPOLY IN AMERICA. BY WALTER ADAMS AND HORACE M. GRAY. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. 178 pages, notes and index, \$3.50).

Space does not permit the quotation of the motif of this book, interestingly and clearly stated in its last two pages. The author deals with the effect of govern-

ment policies and action on increasing industrial concentration. The trend is evidenced by the struggle for the survival of enterprises of the size of the "smaller" automobile companies. The book does not bring out the fact that the present administration seems to be seriously concerned about the trend. The main problem might be stated thus: to what extent is it feasible to prevent growing industrial concentration in the face of increasingly larger and more complicated mass production techniques? The reviewer notes the absence of a chapter on the role of the administrations of the two previous decades in the promotion of quasi-monopolistic power concentration in other fields.

—WALTER OERTLY

LL.D., University of Berne

LABOR'S WAGE POLICIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. BY JAMES S. YOUTSLER. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. 316 pages, notes and index, \$5.00).

A professor of economics at Skidmore College discusses some policies and results of the American trade union movement during the first half of this century. The impact of the wage policies on the stability of the price level since World War I has been treated somewhat lightly by this author. He states that "it may well be that the gains which organized labor has received since 1946 have been partly at the expense of fixed income groups." But it is his opinion "that the trade union movement, on the whole, has not adversely affected prices." Many economists including this reviewer disagree.

W.O.

WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY. BY REINHARD BENDIX. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956. 452 pages, author and subject index, \$7.50).

Here is an important book on a most important subject: the development of managerial ideology and power structure during the growth of industrialization. The fields selected cover Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century England and Nineteenth Century America contrasted with

industrial managerial development in Tsarist Russia and in East Germany under Communist domination. The reviewer may be permitted to state from experience that American management can and probably will be flexible enough to adapt its approach to the enormous problems of today and tomorrow. Managerial selection is a case in point: in the decades of the 1910's and 1920's the best technician would usually be selected for managerial advancement. In the 1930's and 1940's the emphasis shifted to the man that could get things done within a well organized framework of responsibility. In the 1950's the emphasis again has shifted to the man who has the knack of establishing good relationships with subordinates and fellow managers—the man who operates well within a group. And it is pleasing to report that anyone attending the meeting of the American Management Association in New York in May, 1956, could testify to the fact that American management as represented there is fully aware of the shift in attitude and ideology called for by changing conditions. Perhaps one of the reasons why the author closes with the note: "There are more assets in the Western and more liabilities in the Russian tradition than have yet been brought to the fore."

W.O.

Commentaries on World War Two

THE FATAL DECISIONS. Edited by SEYMOUR FREIDIN AND WILLIAM RICHARDSON. (New York: William Sloane Associates. 295 pages and index, \$4.00).

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS. BY WALTER BEDELL SMITH. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956. 229 pages and index, \$3.95).

MIRACLE OF WORLD WAR II. BY FRANCIS WALTON. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956. 559 pages and index, \$7.50).

Here are three books that curiously "hang together."

THE FATAL DECISIONS is a book that offers an interesting view behind the totalitarian curtain of pretended organizational perfection into the actual situation. The parochial attitude of continental land warfare, undervaluing the role of naval might and American power is notable. Six German generals who were responsible for the "fatal decisions" analyze them here.

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS are coolly and ably presented by his brilliant chief of staff, Walter Bedell Smith.

Both books stress the role of specific, vastly important decisions. The reviewer submits that different decisions, though they might have made a given campaign longer or more costly for the Allies, could hardly have altered the final outcome of the war. Gertrude Stein's dictum comes to mind to the effect that wars simply bring into the open, into visible reality, conditions already existing though possibly veiled—in this case the vast store of energy of the American people, the broad view of its military leaders and the enormous potential of the industrial organization of this country.

MIRACLE OF WORLD WAR II deals in a lively manner with the last named factor. Author and newspaperman Francis Walton describes wartime American industry in considerable detail: the materials, the means and the catalyst. Subtitle of the study is "How American Industry Made Victory Possible."

W.O.

History and Politics

A WORLD IN REVOLUTION. BY SIDNEY LENS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 250 pages, \$3.75).

A labor leader looks at the world's problems in this brief study and sees "A World in Revolution." He notes that the tragedy of capitalist effort "is that it never advanced beyond a few countries of western Europe and America." He describes the static nature of latter-day

feudalism, "opposed to change, hostile to freedom." In most underdeveloped countries "What is lacking is the social mechanism for capital accumulation! Lacking also is basic social change." This analysis Mr. Lens applies specifically to the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East which the capitalist world hopes to win as allies. He notes that historically expanding capitalism was weeded to feudalism. Companies like Aramco only become "superficial graftings on the feudal body." As he sees it, "The world in which America has risen to greatness and which she now hopes to save from Stalinism is not a world she has made in her own image, but a world she inherited, primarily from the British. That world is an anachronism, basically feudal and held in check by imperialism." Mr. Lens makes concrete suggestions for changes in our foreign policy; his study deserves careful consideration.

ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR LEWIS NAMIER. Edited by RICHARD PARES AND A. J. P. TAYLOR. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1956. 542 pp., \$10.00).

In this interesting collection of essays, twelve of the sixteen articles deal with questions of English history ranging from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. These essays are, as the publisher says, concerned with topics in Sir Lewis' chosen fields. Other essays deal with Eastern Europe and with the First World War.

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL CHANGE. BY CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. 36 pp., \$1.00).

This book is of particular interest to the student of sociology. It traces the historical and philosophical developments in the major theories of social change. The author, discussing sociology in terms of social change, concerns himself with such major figures as Hegel and Comte (with whom he believes modern theories of social change originate) as well as with the more recent theories of Toynbee and Sorokin. An examination of the modern theories of social change is concerned with

what the author terms the existentialists, the pessimists, and the realists.

Political Theory

POWER AND COMMUNITY. BY ROBERT STRAUZ-HUPÉ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 129 pages, footnotes and index, \$3.00).

Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Robert Strausz-Hupé analyzes the nature of power in six powerfully written chapters describing: power; power and personality; power and history; power and science; power and community; power and security. He attacks the neo-realism that sees social change "prompted by the pursuit of power," and the philosophy of power that holds that "social relations are, by definition, power relationships." He calls attention to the "falling away of the checks and balances that safeguarded human freedom," pointing out that "There is no other curb upon the power of the state than power that is not of the state." When he concludes that the power of the modern democratic state must be utilized to protect mankind from tyranny, he is eloquent in attacking materialist philosophy. His attacks on pacifism as "a secular political movement" have validity, although they allow little significance to that "religious conviction" which surely shares his opposition to materialism and to philosophies of power.

SUPREMACY AND PEACE. BY CHARLES C. HILLIARD. (New York: North River Press, 1956. 219 pages, \$3.50).

The author of *The Cross, The Sword and The Dollar* turns to the metaphysical and the epistemological to justify his conclusions that patriotism is akin to religion and that pacifism is misguided. He quotes Theodore Roosevelt: "If I must choose between righteousness and peace, I choose righteousness." Is there always choice? Like Robert Strausz-Hupé, Mr. Hilliard seems unwilling to consider a non-violent alternative to militarism or a philosophy that war is not inevitable.

A Letter To Hans Gatzke

This letter was originally sent to Hans W. Gatzke with the note that his article on "Reunification" in our April *Report on Germany* was a fine *Zusammenfassung*. Critical comments follow:

... May I take the liberty of making a few comments on your article, based not on great scholarship, but rather on daily intercourse with people, Germans of course, who are deeply involved with the problem? The day hardly goes by that I don't discuss some aspect of it with one or more Germans.

Firstly, as you indicated, the term "reunification" has become a political shibboleth in Germany—or at least in the Federal Republic. I agree with you that there are hardly any Germans, despite the dark hints of the SPD and others, who don't want reunification in *peace and freedom* now. Nevertheless, it is being used as a primary political campaign issue—a condition that almost invariably results in more heat than light being engendered. This is, of course, one of the great dangers. It does not take too much imagination to visualize a political group making all kinds of extravagant political promises on this subject, arousing feelings to a high intensity, and then having to carry out the promises one way or another. One can only hope that there are enough sound, sensible heads in Germany to prevent this.

It seems to me that a wrong impression can be gained from your comment on p. 208 that "Russia's reply to those Western steps consisted ... partly in counter-measures ultimately leading to the establishment of a Communist-dominated German regime in the East." This statement might well lead to the belief that prior to this time (1948) the Russians had not taken such steps. Actually they followed such a course from the very beginning. Either known Communists (many of them who had become Russian citizens upon fleeing to the Soviet Union after 1933) or "trusted" opportunists (including members of von Paulus' officers' committee) were put in almost all key positions in the Soviet Zone from the very beginning. I cannot believe that there ever was any intention on the part of the Soviet Union

to do anything other than create a communist dictatorship in all of Germany if possible, if not at least in their Zone. To say this happened as a *reply* to Western measures gives, I believe, a different impression.

Your comment on p. 209 that to the Western Powers reunification is desirable only "as long as it does not interrupt their relations with Western Germany" and that "Western interests are sufficiently served by, maintaining the *status quo*, at least as long as the German people remain satisfied with things as they are" is not in accordance with the policy of the United States Government (I won't presume to speak for the British or French) toward reunification. We believe that the continued division of Germany is not only an injustice to the German people, but also a continuing dangerous situation in the heart of Europe. It is therefore our policy to do everything we can, which is unfortunately not too much, to further peaceful German reunification on the basis of free elections (*in Frieden und Freiheit*) which is the only basis on which the large majority of Germans with whom I have spoken want reunification. Western interests are not served by maintaining the *status quo* since that means leaving a potential tinderbox in the heart of Europe. Reunification on Russian terms, of course, will serve our interests, and those of the overwhelming majority of Germans, even less, in fact not at all. Therefore it seems to me that one can hardly speak of reunification *per se*. The problem is really continued separation vs. reunification on Western, including West German, terms vs. reunification on Russian terms. . . .

If you will forgive me, I would also like to take serious objection to your statements on p. 210 that NATO is the "major obstacle to German reunification" and "the major obstacle to reunification, as we have seen, is Russia's objection to German rearma-

ment." This, of course, was, and to a great extent remains, the point of view of the German Social Democratic Party during the long debates on the Paris Treaties and German adherence to NATO. Russian fears of German rearmament may play a part in her refusal to consider reunification on any basis other than that of her own proposals (which stripped of its verbiage mean the communization of all Germany, as Molotov pointed out in the second Geneva Conference of 1955). If that fear, however, be really the decisive factor, I find it difficult to understand why the Russians refused to consider reunification, or the steps that would have led to it, in the post-war years prior to the creation of NATO and prior to the time any proposals were made for German rearmament. Furthermore, if she fears German rearmament why did she build up the East Germany Army . . . long before any West German military units were even approved?

I do not, of course, know the Soviet reasons for any of their policies. There seems to be, however, several explanations of the Russian refusal to consider German reunification with free elections. . . .

1. There is no doubt that the Communists would lose in such free elections. As you say, a Communist vote of 10% in the Soviet Zone is the highest estimate I have ever heard. Five per cent may actually be closer to what would happen.

2. This would, of course, have the danger to the Russians of losing the uranium fields and the other economic advantages, which are not inconsiderable. . . .

3. This would also mean that their puppets (Pieck, Ulbricht, Grotewohl, *et al*) would not lose power but would probably have to flee to Russia again to save their lives. I find it inconceivable that they would continue to live in Germany in view of the crimes, many of them as bad as Hitler's, which they have committed, and allowed to be committed, against their own people. The reaction to such a situation in the other satellites could only be damaging to the interests of Soviet communism and imperialism since it could very probably lead to at least the attempt by some of these countries to adopt the independent attitude of Tito.

The effect on the puppet leaders of other satellites of Soviet agreement to German reunification with free elections is almost, or so it seems to me, bound to be the fear that the masters in the Kremlin will give them up whenever it suits their purposes. . . .

Although these reasons seem to me to explain the Soviet refusal to consider reunification with free elections better than any other, they also make the situation, unfortunately, more desperate—even from the German point of view. A future German government could conceivably give up its ties to NATO (remember that the Western position is that Germany's continued membership in NATO is something to be decided by the freely elected government of a reunified Germany) and its rearmament plans in favor of reunification on its terms. But only a West-German Government which was willing to accept communization of the whole country could "make a deal" with the Soviet Union if my statement of the Russian position is correct. I do not believe any West-German Government could or would accept such a condition.

An interesting footnote on the attitude toward reunification on the part of the expellees from beyond the Oder-Neisse is that many of them are the strongest exponents of European integration, some even putting it ahead of reunification (thinking of that only in terms of the area of the Soviet Zone of Germany). Their reasoning is that since the area east of the Oder-Neisse is largely emptied of Germans the campaign would really only be for land and not for the freedom of 18,000,000 souls and therefore won't have nearly as much emotional appeal. Therefore, they feel that only with the support of a strong unified Europe and a strong Free World do they have any hopes of getting the Soviets to relinquish their homeland. Incidentally, I have never met a German, nor ever heard of one, who was willing to risk war for reunification of either the Soviet Zone or the area now in Polish and Russian hands.

SANFORD S. MARLOWE
U. S. Information Service
American Consulate General
Duesseldorf, Germany.

World Documents

SOUTHERN DECLARATION ON INTEGRATION

THE DOCTRINE of states' rights which reached its climax in the Civil War is reiterated by congressmen from the several southern states. The states' rights theory which was incorporated into the Tenth Amendment is part of the Anglo-American inheritance passed on by John Locke in the Seventeenth Century. The theory of states' rights was originally intended to place limits on the central government in order to safeguard the liberties and individual rights of free men. Thomas Jefferson and the agrarian democrats favored states' rights as a means of protecting the rights of a minority from encroachment by the majority. It was not devised, as Southerners later interpreted it in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, to deprive men of their "life, liberty and property."

The text which follows is a protest against the Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*¹ in which segregation in the public schools was held to be unconstitutional. It is an argument for a return to the 1896 decision in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson* in which the "separate but equal" doctrine originated. Ninety-six congressmen assert that the opinion of the Supreme Court in 1896 was of greater validity than the more recent ruling of May 17, 1954. A controversy has resulted in Congress as to whether or not the Supreme Court may reverse itself and override "an established legal principle almost a century old." The Supreme Court in 1954 took into account the psychological insecurities resulting from racial segregation.

This is a complete denial of the argument in the Plessy Case that "if the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York in *People v. Gallagher*, 93 N.Y. 438, 448, 'this end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed to operate.' . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."

The text of a Declaration of Constitutional Principles signed on March 11 by 19 Senators and 27 Representatives, all from southern states, follows:

The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases is now bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked power for established law.

The Founding Fathers gave us a Constitution of checks and balances because they realized the inescapable lesson of history that

no man or group of men can be safely entrusted with unlimited power. They framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by amendment in order to secure the fundamentals of government against the dangers of temporary popular passion or the personal predilections of public officeholders.

We regard the decision of the Supreme

¹ See *Current History*, July, 1954, for complete text.

Court in the school cases as clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the states and the people.

The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other amendment. The debates preceding the submission of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly show that there was no intent that it should affect the systems of education maintained by the states.

The very Congress which proposed the amendment subsequently provided for segregated schools in the District of Columbia.

When the amendment was adopted in 1868, there were thirty-seven states of the Union. Every one of the twenty-six states that had any substantial racial differences among its people either approved the operation of segregated schools already in existence or subsequently established such schools by action of the same lawmaking body which considered the Fourteenth Amendment.

As admitted by the Supreme Court in the public school case (*Brown v. Board of Education*), the doctrine of separate but equal schools "apparently originated in *Roberts v. City of Boston* (1849), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality." This constitutional doctrine began in the North—not in the South—and it was followed not only in Massachusetts but in Connecticut, New York, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and other northern states until they, exercising their rights as states through the constitutional processes of local self-government, changed their school systems.

In the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896 the Supreme Court expressly declared that under the Fourteenth Amendment no person was denied any of his rights if the states provided separate but equal public facilities. This decision has been followed in many other cases. It is notable that the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, a former President of the United States, unanimously declared in 1927 in *Lum v. Rice* that the "separate but equal" principle

is "... within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment."

This interpretation, restated time and again, became a part of the life of the people of many of the states and confirmed their habits, customs, traditions and way of life. It is founded on elemental humanity and common sense, for parents should not be deprived by government of the right to direct the lives and education of their own children.

Though there has been no constitutional amendment or act of Congress changing this established legal principle almost a century old, the Supreme Court of the United States, with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.

This unwarranted exercise of power by the court, contrary to the Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the states principally affected. It is destroying the amicable relations between the white and Negro races that have been created through ninety years of patient effort by the good people of both races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where there has been heretofore friendship and understanding.

Without regard to the consent of the governed, outside agitators are threatening immediate and revolutionary changes in our public school systems. If done, this is certain to destroy the system of public education in some of the states.

With the gravest concern for the explosive and dangerous condition created by this decision and inflamed by outside meddlers:

We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land.

We decry the Supreme Court's encroachments on rights reserved to the states and to the people, contrary to established law and to the Constitution.

We commend the motives of those states which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means.

We appeal to the states and people who are not directly affected by these decisions to consider the constitutional principles involved against the time when they too, on

issues vital to them, may be the victims of judicial encroachment.

Even though we constitute a minority in the present Congress, we have full faith that a majority of the American people believe in the dual system of government which has enabled us to achieve our greatness and will in time demand that the reserved rights of the states and of the people be made secure against judicial usurpation.

We pledge ourselves to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.

In this trying period, as we all seek to right this wrong, we appeal to our people not to be provoked by the agitators and troublemakers invading our states and to scrupulously refrain from disorder and lawless acts. Signed by:

Members of the United States Senate:

ALABAMA—JOHN SPARKMAN and LISTER HILL.
ARKANSAS—J. W. FULBRIGHT and JOHN L. McCLELLAN.

FLORIDA—GEORGE A. SMATHERS and SPESSARD L. HOLLAND.

GEORGIA—WALTER F. GEORGE and RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

LOUISIANA—ALLEN J. ELLENDER and RUSSELL B. LONG.

MISSISSIPPI—JOHN STENNIS and JAMES O. EASTLAND.

NORTH CAROLINA—SAM J. ERVIN, JR., and W. KERR SCOTT.

SOUTH CAROLINA—STROM THURMON and OLIN D. JOHNSTON.

TEXAS—PRICE DANIEL.

VIRGINIA—HARRY F. BYRD and A. WILLIS ROBERTSON.

Members of the United States House of Representatives:

ALABAMA—FRANK J. BOYKIN, GEORGE M.

GRANT, GEORGE M. ANDREWS, KENNETH R. ROBERTS, ALBERT RAINS, ARMISTEAD I. SELDEN, JR., CARL ELLIOTT, ROBERT E. JONES and GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR.

ARKANSAS—E. C. GATHINGS, WILBUR D. MILLS, JAMES W. TRIMBLE, OREN HARRIS, BROOKS HAYS, F. W. NORRELL.

FLORIDA—CHARLES E. BENNETT, ROBERT L. SIKES, A. S. HERLONG, JR., PAUL G. ROGERS, JAMES A. HALEY, D. R. MATTHEWS.

GEORGIA—PRINCE H. PRESTON, JOHN L. PILCHER, E. L. FORRESTER, JOHN JAMES FLYNT, JR., JAMES C. DAVIS, CARL VINSON, HENDERSON LANHAM, IRIS F. BLITCH, PHIL M. LANDRUM, PAUL BROWN.

LOUISIANA—F. EDWARD HEBERT, HALE BOGGS, EDWIN E. WILLIS, OVERTON BROOKS, OTTO E. PASSMAN, JAMES H. MORRISON, T. ASHTON THOMPSON, GEORGE S. LONG.

MISSISSIPPI—THOMAS G. ABERNETHY, JAMIE L. WHITTEN, FRANK E. SMITH, JOHN BELL WILLIAMS, ARTHUR WINSTED, WILLIAM M. COLMER.

NORTH CAROLINA—HERBERT C. BONNER, L. H. FOUNTAIN, GRAHAM A. BARDEN, CARL T. DURHAM, F. ERTHEL CARLYLE, HUGH Q. ALEXANDER, WOODROW W. JONES, GEORGE A. SHUFORD.

SOUTH CAROLINA—L. MENDEL RIVERS, JOHN J. RILEY, W. J. BRYAN DORN, ROBERT T. ASHMORE, JAMES P. RICHARDS, JOHN L. McMILLAN.

TENNESSEE—JAMES B. FRAZIER, JR., TOM MURRAY, JERE COOPER, CLIFFORD DAVIS.

TEXAS—WRIGHT PATMAN, JOHN DOWDY, WALTER ROGERS, O. C. FISHER.

VIRGINIA—EDWARD J. ROBESON, JR., PORTER HARDY, JR., J. VAUGHAN GARY, WATKINS M. ABBITT, WILLIAM M. TUCK, RICHARD H. POFF, BURR P. HARRISON, HOWARD W. SMITH, W. PAT JENNINGS, JOEL T. BROYHILL.



"The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a league; and whether it be formed by a compact between the states or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the states; they retained all the power they did not grant. . . .

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

International Labor Conference

June 7—Communist countries at the International Labor Conference protest the debarment of Communist employer delegates from working committees of the conference by Western representatives who charge that in Communist countries the only employer is the state.

June 28—The International Labor Organization approves the principles of an international convention outlawing the use of forced labor. Soviet amendments to broaden the scope of the condemnation and offensive to Western delegates are defeated.

NATO Policy

June 22—The Committee of Three of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formulates a questionnaire to be sent to the 15 member nations to determine how best to promote cooperation and non-military programs within the alliance.

June 30—General Gruenther announces the retirement of Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin of France as Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Central European Forces on October 1.

United Nations

June 1—Arab countries refuse to accept the modified British resolution that the United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld continue his efforts to establish peace in the Middle East.

June 4—The Security Council yields to Arab demands and deletes controversial clauses in the resolution that the Secretary General "continue his good offices" in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

June 9—16 members of the United Nations Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are removed from 3 ports of entry, Inchon,

Kunsan and Pusan until Communist violation of the Korean armistice ceases.

June 18—Thirteen members of the 25 nation Asian-African group in the U.N. formally decide to ask the Security Council to consider the French-Algerian question.

June 22—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld announces he will visit the Soviet Union in July.

June 26—The Security Council decides against debating the French-Algerian question.

Western Europe

June 5—West Germany and France agree on the political re-integration of the Saar with Germany, and on provisions for economic relations between the Saar and France. A detailed treaty will follow. The controversy over French exploitation of the Warndt coal mines is also resolved.

June 19—The European Coal and Steel Community reports an increase in the production of coal, iron ore and unfinished steel among the 6 nations participating in the community. Trade among these countries (France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands) of coal and steel and other products has increased as well.

June 27—The Coal and Steel Community orders France to discontinue its Technical Association for Coal Imports which organizes France's coal imports. The High Authority asserts that it violates the Coal and Steel Community agreement because French purchasers are denied free access to producers in any of the 6 participating countries, a violation of the single market principle.

ARGENTINA

June 1—812 Ukrainians and Byelorussians leave Argentina to return to their native land under the Soviet Union's repatriation program.

June 5—Lieutenant General Julio Alberto Lagos is replaced as head of the Argentine Army by Major General Francisco José Zerde by order of Provisional President Pedro Aramburu.

June 7—New appointments are made in the Argentine Army. Cabinet posts are reduced from 17 to 12.

June 10—Forty rebels are executed after Air Force and Navy planes quell a Peronist counter-revolution.

June 12—General Juan José Vallee, a principal leader in the Peronist revolt, is captured and executed.

June 13—President Aramburu's government ends the state of martial law in effect since the revolt and halts the executions of supporters of the revolt.

June 14—Haiti's Ambassador to Argentina, Jean F. Brierre, reports that armed men attacked his residence and removed General Raul Tanco, a principal in the June 10 revolt, who had sought asylum there.

June 29—200 persons are seized by government forces. Unofficial comment reports this is an attempt to oust die-hard Peronists.

AUSTRIA

June 29—The new Austrian Government, which is a coalition of the Right-wing People's party and the Socialists, is sworn in today following the elections of May 13. Julius Raab remains in the post of Chancellor.

BOLIVIA

June 17—Herman Siles Zuazo is elected President on the National Revolutionary Movement ticket; his party will rule for another 4 years. Mr. Zuazo is vice-president of the present Government.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

June 9—The Government, preoccupied with the controversial pipelines debate, finds itself without funds to pay its civil servants the week of June 14.

June 11—The Conservative and Socialist leaders of Canada's Opposition appropriate money so that the Liberal Govern-

ment may pay its bills for another month.

June 18—Canada plans to continue spending 40 per cent of its national revenue on defense, of which the largest amount is granted to the Royal Canadian Air Force.

June 21—Premier Maurice Duplessis and his National Union Government return to power in the Quebec elections.

Ceylon

June 12—Riots continue over the Government's plan to make Sinhalese the sole official language of Ceylon, a plan opposed by the Tamil-speaking minority.

June 15—Parliament passes the Sinhalese Language Bill.

June 29—The United States and Ceylon sign an agreement to give Ceylon appropriations under the U. S. economic aid and technical assistance program for 1956.

Great Britain

June 6—The head of the Foreign Office news department declares that the government will not allow exports to Communist China that will build up its military potential.

June 12—The British Medical Research Council warns of the hazards to human bone structure and to blood cells from radioactive fallout.

June 13—Britain hands Egypt full responsibility for defending the Suez Canal after 74 years of British occupation.

The British Government overrules Yemen's claim to the British protectorate of Aden.

June 14—Great Britain and the United States sign an agreement for the exchange of nuclear information, whereby Great Britain is to receive data on the atomic powered submarine.

June 17—The Labor party demands that the Government's power in security cases be re-examined so that individual liberty may be protected.

June 21—British Communists protest the complete denunciation of Stalin by Russian leaders.

June 27—The Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth begin their conference. The main issues dividing Com-

monwealth countries are racial and international.

June 26—The British Government will cut its expenses by 76 million pounds, more than half of this sum being cut from the defense budget.

June 29—The British Government decides to settle for the 34 million pounds that West Germany offers to contribute to the support of British troops in Germany this year.

India

June 3—Rioting in Bombay results from Prime Minister Nehru's statement that Bombay city will be federally controlled for 5 years. Agitators want Bombay to be included in a Marathi-speaking state.

June 15—The Vice President of India, Sarvepalli Radikrishnan, visits the Soviet Union on his world tour.

Pakistan

June 1—Premier Iskander Mirza returns control of East Pakistan to Chief Minister Abu Hussain Sarker. The administration was suspended because President Mirza feared that it could not cope with the threat of famine.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Cyprus

June 5—Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Governor of Cyprus, reports improvement in the situation in Cyprus in talks in London.

June 13—Prime Minister Anthony Eden reveals that the U. S. has supported the British offer of self-government to Cyprus.

June 14—The 6 man inner cabinet of the Ethnarchy, the advisory council to Archbishop Makarios, now in exile, offers to "study secretly" a British draft of a constitution for Cyprus, which will be passed on to the Archbishop with recommendations.

June 21—Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templer, plans to visit Turkey in an attempt to convince the Turkish Government that the union of Greece with Cyprus will not jeopardize Turkish security.

June 25—Terrorists shoot British Justice Shaw, who had sentenced 6 Greek Cypriote terrorists to death.

Kenya

June 24—The Arabs demand that the rental to Britain for the 170-mile Kenya coast-land be increased.

Singapore

June 4—The Government announces lifting of the ban on shipments of rubber from Singapore and the Federation of Malaya to Communist China.

June 7—David Marshall resigns as Chief Minister and is succeeded by Lim Yew Hock.

Zanzibar

June 20—Zanzibar, a protectorate of Great Britain, takes a step towards self-rule with the innovation of common-roll elections for 6 of the 12 non-official members of the Legislative Council.

BURMA

June 5—Premier U Nu resigns for one year to reorganize his party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. He is succeeded by former defense minister Ba Swe.

CHILE

June 4—President Carlos Ibañez completes the reorganization of his Cabinet.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

June 4—Syria decides "in principle" to recognize Communist China.

June 15—The Peiping budget which is presented to the Parliament shows an increase for the development of heavy industry and agriculture and a cut in defense expenditure.

June 23—Communist China and Russia sign a protocol for the exchange of agricultural, industrial, and technical data.

June 28—Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China offers to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government the possibility of the "peaceful liberation of Taiwan."

June 29—An Indian newspaper reports that Tibetan rebels have fought and heavily

injured Chinese Communist troops in eastern Tibet.

CUBA

June 2—President Fulgencio Batista removes censorship restrictions on the press, which have been in effect since the attempted revolt of last April.

June 6—The arrest of former President Carlos Prío Socarras is ordered by a Cuban court. Dr. Socarras has received political asylum in the United States and is living in Miami.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

June 7—New York police examine the Dominican freighter *Fundación* in a search for the missing Dr. Jesús de Galindez.

June 15—The United States and the Dominican Republic sign an agreement to cooperate on the development of peaceful uses of atomic power.

ECUADOR

June 3—A record number of voters turn out to elect a new Congress and President.

June 6—Deputy Minister of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Galo Almeida Urrutia, is arrested on charges of conspiracy to upset the returns of the recent presidential election.

EGYPT

June 18—The 74 years of British occupation of the Suez Canal end with a proclamation by Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser.

June 19—As Premier Nasser proclaims Egypt's freedom from foreign flags flying over its soil, he also abolishes the state of martial law and of press censorship.

June 20—Soviet weapons highlight the largest display of Arabian arms yet to be seen in the Middle East as the celebration of the evacuation of British troops from the Suez continues.

June 24—Gamal Nasser becomes the first elected president of the Egyptian Republic. He receives 99 per cent of the vote cast for the uncontested office. The new constitution also receives an overwhelming approval.

June 28—The trial of 69 persons accused of belonging to an underground Egyptian Communist party, which was continued during the recent visit of Soviet Minister Shepilov, leads to the imprisonment of 40 of these Red leaders.

FRANCE

June 2—Premier Mollet asks the National Assembly for a new vote of confidence after 3 days of debate on governmental policies. Algeria is offered wider self-government upon the restoration of peace.

Foreign Minister Christian Pineau orders a reshuffling of top level posts in the French Foreign Ministry.

June 5—Premier Mollet wins a blanket approval of his program, both foreign and domestic, on a vote of confidence in the National Assembly. However, he wins by a much smaller vote than he has previously received, the vote being 271 to 59, with 201 abstentions.

June 7—2,000 persons take part in a riot to delay the departure of 15 reservists from Le Havre who are to fight in Algeria.

June 9—France is the fourth nation to claim a South China Sea group of islands, the Spratlys. Nationalist China, Communist China, South Vietnam, and a Filipino national have also laid claim to this island group.

June 10—Premier Mollet wins support from the Socialist Party's National Council after making a standing truce offer to Algerian rebels. Reversing his former position that a cease-fire was akin to surrender, Premier Mollet states a willingness to make contact with Algerian rebels to discuss a cease-fire.

June 13—The Social Democratic party re-to discuss peace in Algeria with nationalist Ferhat Abbas because he does not stress indissoluble ties with France.

June 15—Police take possession of today's edition of *L'Humanité*, Communist newspaper, for its reporting on the Algerian crisis. This is the second such seizure in the last 5 weeks.

June 16—Foreign Minister Pineau of France arrives in Washington for talks with United States Secretary of State Dulles on

the problems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

June 18—Foreign Minister Pineau asks the U. S. to review its restrictive policy on trade with Communist China.

In line with British and Italian criticism of Stalin's successors, the French Communist party lashes out against the present Soviet leaders as well as against Stalin.

June 21—The National Assembly gives Premier Mollet 3 votes of confidence on the proposed increase in old age pensions.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

June 19—Two Algerian rebels are executed, bringing to a close the period of leniency during the Algerian crisis.

June 20—The French Cabinet approves the breakdown of Algeria's 4 departments into 12 new and smaller ones to solve the problem of "under-administration."

June 23—Nationalist violence flares in retaliation for the French execution of 2 terrorists.

June 27—The first step towards carrying out major economic reforms in Algeria is taken as the French Cabinet authorizes the expropriation of large agricultural lands for distribution to landless Moslems.

Tunisia

June 4—Salah ben Youssef, Tunisian rebel leader, is named commander in chief of the Tunisian Liberation Army which has its headquarters in Cairo.

June 15—France and Tunisia sign an agreement which confirms Tunisia's independence in foreign affairs. France in return receives no assurance of Tunisian co-operation.

EAST GERMANY

June 20—87 Soviet fighter planes are removed from Brandenburg to Poland.

June 21—The East German Government reveals that 19 thousand persons have been released from prison in the last several weeks, to increase understanding and cooperation between East and West Germany.

2000 Soviet soldiers are withdrawn from Weimar to return home.

June 30—East Germany reduces its armed forces by 30 thousand men.

WEST GERMANY

June 7—The West German government agrees to pay part of the cost of maintaining United States troops in West Germany for another year.

June 8—A Defense Ministry official announces that West Germany will have a 96-thousand-man army by the end of the year.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer leaves to visit the United States to discuss the problem of German reunification.

June 13—The Social Democratic party reveals its foreign policy program for a unified and neutral Germany. It hopes this program will defeat Dr. Adenauer in the general elections next year.

June 22—The Adenauer Government prepares an anti-inflation program to keep the present economic boom under control.

GUATEMALA

June 24—President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala suspends 13 constitutional rights for the next 30 days in order to ward off the possibility of a Communist plot to create disturbances.

HONDURAS

June 19—The Liberal party and the Nationalist party join to force the resignation of President Julio Lozano Diaz and his government.

ICELAND

June 1—Iceland formally notifies the United States of its parliament's decision that United States troops should be withdrawn from Iceland.

June 27—Herman Jonasson, leader of the Progressive party, whose winning combination with the Social Democrats was victorious in the June 25 election and who is slated to be premier, insists on the withdrawal of U. S. troops.

IRAN

June 7—Iranian troops take possession of Soviet oil concession works in Khuryan in northeastern Iran.

June 25—Shah Pahlevi arrives in Moscow on a visit.

ISRAEL

June 17—Premier David Ben-Gurion succeeds in forcing the resignation of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett.

June 18—Mrs. Golda Myerson, Labor Minister, succeeds Mr. Sharett as Israel's foreign minister.

ITALY

June 9—Negotiations to unify the Italian Socialist party fail when the Right- and Left-wings cannot compromise their differences.

JAPAN

June 2—After 4 days of disorder in which the Socialists with 68 of the 250 seats in the upper house of the Japanese Diet employ stratagems including the use of force to prevent this legislative body from taking action, the Japanese Parliament finally passes two bills to increase government control of education.

June 4—The Japanese Diet approves an \$800 million World War II reparations settlement with the Philippines.

June 6—It is revealed that the Soviet Union has seized 125 Japanese fishing boats. These seizures were used by Russia to force the recent fisheries agreement with Japan.

JORDAN

June 30—King Hussein accepts the resignation of Premier Said Mufti and his cabinet to allow for the organization of a caretaker government to hold elections for a new parliament.

LAOS

June 30—The Soviet Union decides to recognize the Kingdom of Laos.

LEBANON

June 5—The Lebanese Cabinet resigns over the domestic issue of the purchase of the Port of Beirut from a company which operates it on a concession basis.

MOROCCO

June 1—In an effort to solve the problem of integrating the Tangier Zone with Morocco while protecting financial investments made during the period of international control, the Tangier Committee of Control agrees with Mr. Ahmed Balafrej, Moroccan Foreign Minister, that the local government of Tangier should be allowed to operate as before.

June 10—Foreign Minister Balafrej arrives in Spain to open discussions on the unification of Morocco with Spanish Morocco in the north in the implementation of Spain's recognition on April 7 of Moroccan independence and unity.

NETHERLANDS

June 15—Queen Juliana begins negotiations with parliamentary leaders to form a new coalition government following yesterday's elections in which the Socialists won a majority of one in the lower house over the Roman Catholic People's party. These two parties have served as a coalition government since World War II.

June 27—The Netherlands signs a trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

PANAMA

June 15—The results of the returns from the general election of May 13 are announced as the very slow count is completed. The party in power, the National Patriotic coalition party, wins 42 seats in the National Assembly against 11 for the Opposition. Ernesto de la Guardia is the new president.

PERU

June 22—Although returns will not be completely counted for at least another week, it appears that Manuel Prado is elected president in the general election of June

17, the first completely free election in 11 years.

June 26—100 thousand Peruvians strike and rioting follows. The strike is called by a federation of unions of private employees to protest the refusal by a subsidiary company of Standard Oil, the International Petroleum Company, Ltd., to grant wage increases to some 400 employees.

POLAND

June 18—The state security service has been purged and security officials have been tried on charges of abusing their power, according to an announcement of the Polish Communist Government.

June 28—Poles rioting in Poznan and crying that they want bread attack the headquarters of the Communist party and other public buildings.

Poland agrees to repay the United States \$110 thousand for non-military lend-lease supplies.

June 29—Polish troops quell rioters in Poznan, killing 38.

June 30—The Polish revolt is weeded out further on the third day of fighting.

PORTUGAL

June 29—Portugal offers Western Allies and the United States 2 air bases of strategic importance at Montijo and Espinho. It is believed that Portugal wishes to gain U. S. support for its desired annexation of Goa, to which India also lays claim.

THAILAND

June 21—Thailand officials remove the ban on the export of non-strategic goods to North Korea and Communist China.

TURKEY

June 7—The Grand National Assembly passes a new severe press law to silence critics of Premier Adnan Menderes.

THE U.S.S.R.

June 1—It is revealed that Vyacheslav M. Molotov has resigned as Soviet Foreign Minister and has been succeeded by Dmitri Shepilov, editor of *Pravda*.

Yugoslavia's President, Marshal Tito, arrives in the Soviet Union for conferences.

June 3—Soviet State Prosecutor Roman A. Rudenko asks for "the speediest liquidation of the after-effects of the evil influence of Beria and his band."

June 4—The U. S. State Department releases the text of Nikita S. Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin.

It is disclosed in London that the Soviet authorities have refused to allow two chartered British planes to fly to Moscow carrying tourists and fashion show models.

Nikolai A. Bulganin asks the U. S. and Great Britain to match the Soviet arms cut of 1.2 million men.

June 6—The Moscow radio reports that Premier Bulganin has offered long-term credit to Latin American countries to buy Soviet machinery and installations.

June 7—Communist party leader Khrushchev authorizes release of a speech he made June 2 revealing a difference of opinion between himself and Mme. Ekaterina A. Furtseva, highest ranking woman Communist, over plans to develop Siberia.

A speech delivered by Khrushchev rejecting war as a method of defeating capitalism is published.

June 17—The Soviet Union reveals that 100 thousand tribesmen of the Karachai and Balkar tribes have been exiled in the Kirghiz Republic of Soviet Central Asia since 1943-1944 for their supposed collaboration with the Nazis. It is announced that these tribes are regaining their minority rights and ethnic culture.

June 19—It is reported that the Soviet Union has added to its offer of a loan to Egypt of \$1.12 billion at 2 per cent for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov, on a visit to Cairo, offers economic and technical aid for other industrial developments as well.

June 27—Soviet readers finally learn that the criticism of Stalin appeared originally in Khrushchev's report before the Twentieth Congress last February.

June 28—The Soviet Government's newspaper, *Izvestia*, publishes an article espe-

cially prepared for it by a French radical, Leo Hammon, in which parliamentary democracy is advocated in the Soviet Union.

June 30—The text of Lenin's 33-year-old will is published in the Soviet Union. The will embodies a criticism of Stalin and proposes the ousting of Stalin as Secretary General of the Communist party.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

June 20—Administrator of the Farmers Home Administration Robert B. McLeaish, who resigned yesterday as a Senate committee began an investigation of his agency, says he did so at the suggestion of Secretary Benson.

June 21—The ban on grazing ends for farmers in drought areas where they may now graze livestock on land that is to be put into the soil bank program. The "emergency" operation of the \$1.2 billion soil bank program goes into effect this year with payments to these farmers.

Foreign Policy

June 3—President of Indonesia Sukarno ends a 19-day visit to the United States.

June 4—The State Department publishes the text of Nikita S. Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Communist party Congress, a hitherto secret denunciation of the late Soviet Premier Stalin.

June 5—President Eisenhower opens a last minute fight for his \$4.9 billion foreign aid bill, declaring that drastic reductions will be "dangerous to national security."

June 6—In a press conference, Eisenhower declares that he understands the position of "neutral" nations and mentions the traditional policy of neutrality of the United States.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asks Congress to remove the prohibition on sale and barter of surplus farm goods to Iron Curtain states.

The White House clarifies the President's comments on neutral nations, noting that the President did not intend to disparage the advantages of military alliances; he believes that such alliances are "the

modern and enlightened way of obtaining security."

The State Department announces that the U. S. has traded \$653 million worth of tariff concessions on imports for substantial duty cuts of some \$400 million on exports.

June 8—The House of Representatives rejects attempts to cut down aid to India and to prevent any aid for Yugoslavia.

June 9—Secretary of State Dulles praises treaties that "abolish the principle of neutrality," in a speech on the U. S. Mutual Security Program.

June 11—The House of Representatives passes a foreign aid bill by a vote of 273 to 122 authorizing \$3.8 billion, \$1.109 billion less than President Eisenhower asked.

President Eisenhower decides that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not accept an invitation to visit Moscow June 24.

The U. S. elevates its diplomatic mission in Morocco to the status of an embassy.

June 12—The National Academy of Sciences reports that atomic radiation may prove harmful to victims and to their descendants. Increasing radiation doses may affect the future of the human race.

The U. S. rejects a Communist Chinese proposal for an early meeting of foreign ministers.

President Eisenhower appeals to the Senate to restore \$600 million to his foreign aid program.

June 15—The coming visit of Foreign Minister Pineau of France sparks a warning from a spokesman for the Arab governments against U. S. support of France's position in Algeria.

June 23—3.67 million dollars is granted in aid to Lebanon for the improvement of its road and air transportation. The grant is spurred by the intended visit of Foreign Minister Shepilov of Russia to that country.

Government

June 4—President Eisenhower nominates Dr. Willard Frank Libby for a new term on the Atomic Energy Commission. He nominates James Cunningham Sargent as a

member of the Securities Exchange Commission.

June 6—The Senate unanimously confirms the nomination of Fred A. Seaton as Secretary of the Interior.

June 8—President Eisenhower vetoes a bill providing the Crow Indian tribe in Montana with \$5 million in compensation for a dam site.

June 15—Commissioner of Education Samuel H. Brownell resigns his post.

June 18—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee authorizes the establishment of a \$4,457,575 foreign aid program.

June 19—Senate Democrats force the bill for construction of a federal dam in Hell's Canyon out of the Interior Committee where it has been for a year and onto the Senate floor for debate.

June 22—Senate Democrats demand that Secretary of Defense Wilson be removed from his post for labeling the Democrats' proposed increase of \$1 billion to Air Force appropriations "phony."

Joseph M. Dodge resigns as special assistant to the President on foreign economic policy.

June 26—The Hell's Canyon dam bill clears the House Interior Committee.

Congress approves a \$33 billion road construction bill and sends it to the White House for presidential approval.

June 28—The Senate overrides 2 attempts to insert barriers to world trade into the Administration's foreign aid program. Moves to put quotas on agricultural imports are defeated.

June 29—The Senate defeats a measure to cut the Administration's foreign aid bill by \$1 billion.

Dr. Leonard A. Scheele resigns as Surgeon General of the U. S. Public Health Service.

President Eisenhower signs the \$33 billion road construction bill.

June 30—Secretary Dulles praises the Senate's action in appropriating \$4.5 billion for the Administration's foreign aid program.

The U. S. realizes its first budget surplus in 4 years of approximately \$2.2 billion,

which will be applied against the national debt.

Judiciary

June 11—As the current term ends, the Supreme Court rules by a 6 to 3 vote that federal employees may be dismissed as security risks only if they hold sensitive jobs. - According to published statistics, about half of the "risks" dismissed under Executive Order 10450 held nonsensitive positions.

The Court also rules 5 to 4 that United States military courts may try civilians and dependents of service men who follow the armed forces overseas. The decision involves two cases: that of Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith and that of Mrs. Clarence B. Covert. Both women have been convicted by military courts of killing their husbands while the husbands were in service.

The Court also rules 5 to 4 that the Government may refuse to suspend the deportation of an alien on the basis of confidential information. In the majority opinion the court holds that the grant of suspension of deportation is not like a trial and is not covered by constitutional guarantees of due process.

The Court also dismisses 4 to 3 Justice Department charges that E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company has monopolized the cellophane market illegally.

Labor

June 6—The "Big Three" wage talks in steel begin in New York.

June 16—Steel union leaders spurn the proposal of the three largest steel companies, United States Steel, Bethlehem and Republic, for a 5-year no-strike contract with fixed yearly wage increases, a 52-week unemployment plan, and other employee gains.

June 30—A national steel strike begins at midnight with 650 thousand workers on strike. Neither side makes a proposal for the renewal of negotiations.

Military

June 16—The Government admits that the hydrogen bomb test of May 21 missed its target by a little less than 4 miles.

June 23—General Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, arrives in Moscow to observe the Soviet Air Force Day.

June 25—Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, World War II Commander in Chief of the Fleet, dies of a heart condition.

June 26—The Senate approves a \$34.7 billion defense bill after increasing the Air Force budget \$960 million against the wishes of the Administration. This is the first major repudiation of the President's military program.

Politics

June 6—Adlai Stevenson wins in the California primary election with a landslide victory over Estes Kefauver.

June 9—Governor Averell Harriman announces that he is a candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, and indicates that he will take a strong position on civil rights.

June 10—The thirtieth national convention of the Socialist party nominates Darlington Hoopes for president and Samuel H. Friedman for vice president of the United States.

June 14—Chairman of the National Gas and Oil Resources Committee Leonard McCollum testifies before a Senate committee that his organization did not engage in lobbying, but in educating the public.

Two officials, Matthew Connelly and T. Lamar Caudle, of the Truman administration are found guilty of aiding an income tax-evader, shoe manufacturer Irving Sacks.

June 25—Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts receives support at the Governors' Conference in Atlantic City for the Democratic vice presidential nomination.

June 26—Leonard W. Hall announces that the Republican National Committee plans to spend \$7 million in this year's political campaign.

Twenty Republican governors at the Governors' Conference urge President Eisenhower to run again.

Governor Chandler of Kentucky announces himself a candidate for the Demo-

cratic presidential or vice presidential nomination.

The Presidency

June 9—The President's condition is reported "excellent" after emergency abdominal surgery for an intestinal obstruction.

June 25—The forthcoming talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru of India are postponed until the President has recovered further.

June 30—President Eisenhower leaves the hospital for Gettysburg for his further convalescence.

Segregation

June 1—A State Court in Alabama orders the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to stop operating in Alabama.

June 5—A 3-judge panel in a Federal Court in Montgomery, Alabama, rules 2 to 1 that racial segregation on city buses in Montgomery is unconstitutional.

VIETNAM (NORTH)

June 21—North Vietnam announces the reduction of its army by 80 thousand men.

YEMEN

June 8—Yemen protests formally to the British government against an alleged bombing of a customs post by the R.A.F.

June 24—Yemen and the Soviet Union agree to exchange diplomatic representatives at the conclusion of a visit to Moscow by Crown Prince Seif ul Islam el Badr.

YUGOSLAVIA

June 18—Following the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. on the government level, ties between the Communist parties of these respective countries are also established.

June 24—President Tito makes his first official visit to a Soviet satellite since 1948 as he begins official talks with Rumanian leaders in Bucharest.

June 26—Rumania and Yugoslavia sign an agreement for closer ties between the two countries and their Communist parties.

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
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